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PRESERVING HUMANITY’S HERITAGE IN SPACE:
FIFTY YEARS AFTER APOLLO 11 AND BEYOND
DR. ANDREA J. HARRINGTON*
ABSTRACT
As numerous governments and commercial entities plan am-
bitious expeditions into outer space and to celestial bodies, hu-
manity’s heritage in space is threatened. Fifty years following the
Apollo 11 landing, we have recognized the historic, scientific,
and cultural importance of this event and other spacefaring
firsts, but the existing means to protect the resulting heritage is
inadequate. This Article examines the protections currently
available to those objects and sites that represent the great
achievements of humankind in using and exploring space, with
a focus on Tranquility Base—the Apollo 11 landing site. Existing
protections are analyzed under both cultural heritage law and
international space law, focusing primarily on the language of
relevant treaties in these fields. There have been several endeav-
ors undertaken by the United States to protect the Apollo land-
ing sites in general and Tranquility Base in particular, including
the One Small Step Act passed by the U.S. Senate in July 2019.
These actions are reviewed herein for appropriateness and effi-
cacy. Recommendations to optimize the protection of space her-
itage in the future are then presented. This Article concludes
that the most effective approach consists of a multistep process
that can include unilateral actions, bilateral treaties, and a mul-
tilateral soft law solution, ideally culminating in a multilateral
treaty before potentially leading to the formation of customary
international law. Fundamentally, cooperation and good faith
are the cornerstones of any solution to this issue under interna-
tional law. It is important that the legal rules governing interac-
* Professor Harrington is an Associate Professor and Director of the Schriever
Space Scholars at USAF Air Command and Staff College. The views expressed are
those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S.
Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
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tion with and preservation of these objects and sites be clearly
determined to avoid irreversible damage to a unique and irre-
placeable resource.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
A. THE CULTURAL IMPORTANCE OF SPACE
EXPLORATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
B. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL HERITAGE . . . . . . . . . 304
C. WHAT IS A SPACE OBJECT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
D. WHAT IS SPACE HERITAGE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
1. Space Heritage Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
2. Space Heritages Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
II. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
A. TREATY LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
C. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW FOR
HERITAGE IN SPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
1. Non-Appropriation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
2. Freedom of Access and Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
3. Reciprocal Visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
4. Jurisdiction and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
a. Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
b. Abandonment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
5. Return of Space Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
6. Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
7. Environmental Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
8. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . 338
III. CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
A. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
B. TREATY LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
1. The Hague Convention of 1954 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
2. Illicit Transfer Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
3. World Heritage Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350
4. UNIDROIT Convention of 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
D. THE TERRITORIAL NATURE OF CULTURAL
HERITAGE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
IV. PROTECTING SPACE HERITAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
A. NASA RECOMMENDATIONS AND “KEEP-OUT
ZONES” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
2019] PRESERVING HUMANITY’S HERITAGE IN SPACE 301
B. THE APOLLO LUNAR LANDING SITES NATIONAL
HISTORIC PARK BILL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
C. THE ONE SMALL STEP ACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
D. CALIFORNIA & NEW MEXICO HERITAGE LISTS . . . 363
V. SOLUTIONS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
SPACE HERITAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
A. A BINDING MULTILATERAL SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . 365
1. New Treaty or Annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
2. Amendments to the World Heritage
Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
3. U.N. Trusteeship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368
B. A “SOFT LAW” SOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
C. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
D. UNILATERAL ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
1. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . 374
2. Construction of Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
VI. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE CULTURAL IMPORTANCE OF SPACE EXPLORATION
“ONE SMALL STEP for man, one giant leap for man-kind.”1 These iconic words, spoken by Neil Armstrong
fifty years ago upon alighting on the lunar surface, reflect the
significant impact of space exploration on human civilization.
Escaping the Earth’s atmosphere, landing on the Moon, study-
ing the surface of Mars using highly complex robots, sending
satellites into orbit and probes into deep space constitute signifi-
cant accomplishments in our shared history. How, then, are we
to protect the evidence of these achievements for future genera-
tions? A 2018 White House Report acknowledges that “[t]here
are no legal definitions of ‘preservation’ and ‘protection’ pre-
cisely applicable to lunar sites and artifacts.”2 This Article strives
to analyze the concerns and options regarding protecting cul-
tural heritage in space and provide recommendations for fur-
ther application and development.
1 Eric M. Jones, One Small Step: Apollo 11 Lunar Surface Journal, NASA (1995),
https://www.hq.nasa.gov/alsj/a11/a11.step.html [https://perma.cc/TA86-
4N6A] (last updated Apr. 18, 2018) (transcribing the Apollo 11 audio provided
by NASA).
2 OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PROTECTING
& PRESERVING APOLLO PROGRAM LUNAR LANDING SITES & ARTIFACTS 1 (2018).
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The National Air and Space Museum in Washington receives
more visitors annually than all but one international art mu-
seum (the Muse´e du Louvre).3 It seems unquestionable then
that such items as those displayed in the National Air and Space
Museum are prized for their historic value. The artifacts in outer
space, on Mars, and particularly on the Moon, however, do not
benefit from placement in a museum. Even if the registering
states of these objects, which retain jurisdiction and control in
space law,4 were able to retrieve them, as suggested by the Rus-
sian delegate to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space Legal Subcommittee in 2019,5 it is arguable
that the value of some objects is greater if they remain in place
(in situ), allowing future generations to view and study early
space exploration as accurately as possible. “The question of
whether and how space exploration serves society and culture
deserves deeper thought.”6 The preservation of these artifacts
leaves room for such thought in the future.
This Article analyzes the status of these space heritage objects,
with a twofold goal of articulating possibilities for their protec-
tion in accordance with the existing international law regime
and proposing the development of alternatives that could more
effectively protect these objects. The unique nature of space law
creates a series of difficulties in determining how to deal with
cultural heritage in space.
The key example of cultural heritage in space, which has be-
come a hot topic of discussion, is the set of artifacts left behind
at Tranquility Base by the Apollo 11 mission. Tranquility Base is
a particularly interesting example, because
No heritage site on Earth, of whatever [level of cultural] signifi-
cance, can boast that [the entire] interaction on the site has
been preserved—both because of subsequent interaction by
3 Justin St. P. Walsh, Protection of Humanity’s Cultural and Historic Heritage in
Space, 28 SPACE POL’Y 234, 235 (2012).
4 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. VIII,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
5 See generally Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on Its Sixty-Second
Session, Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/L.319 (Feb. 4, 2019); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on Its
Fifty-Ninth Session, Working Paper Submitted by the Russian Federation, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/L.304, at 12 (2016).
6 Linda Billings, To the Moon, Mars, and Beyond: Culture, Law, and Ethics in Space-
Faring Societies, 26 BULL. SCI. TECH. & SOC’Y 430, 435 (2006).
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other people and also because of the presence of an atmosphere
on Earth with the concomitant erosive forces of wind and water.7
Thus, this Article uses Tranquility Base and its artifacts as the
model for analysis of space heritage.
The issue of humanity’s cultural heritage in space has arisen
as one of many unanswered questions in space law, with no in-
ternational agreements specifically addressing it. With the be-
ginning of the space age fifty-six years ago and a series of
remarkable achievements in space exploration behind us, it is
necessary to determine what should be done regarding the “arti-
facts” of this exploration.
NASA has promulgated their recommendations for spacefar-
ing entities with the goal of protecting the lunar artifacts left
behind by the Apollo missions.8 These recommendations estab-
lish “keep-out zones” of up to a four kilometer diameter with the
aim of protecting the artifacts, particularly from dangerous, fast-
moving particles that arise as a result of craft landings.9 Experi-
ence has shown that even artifacts that are sheltered by craters
can be significantly sandblasted and pitted as a result of the
moving particles.10 These recommendations, supposedly drafted
in conformity with the Outer Space Treaty, however, are com-
pletely nonbinding.11 Legislation that has passed the U.S. Senate
and is under consideration by the House of Representatives as
of July 2019 would make these recommendations binding on
U.S. entities seeking to land on the Moon.12
Accidental damage from unrelated missions, however, is only
one of many threats to space artifacts. With the impending re-
turn to the Moon, it is likely that individuals and corporations
will be looking to turn a profit from space heritage, without con-
cern for the protection of such heritage. Tourists may disrupt
7 Dirk H.R. Spennemann, Out of this World: Issues of Managing Tourism and Hu-
manity’s Heritage on the Moon, 12 INT’L J. HERITAGE STUD. 356, 362 (2006).
8 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-
FARING ENTITIES: HOW TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE HISTORIC AND SCIENTIFIC
VALUE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT LUNAR ARTIFACTS (2011), http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
617743main_NASA-USG_LUNAR_HISTORIC_SITES_RevA-508.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WSL5-BN58] [hereinafter NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING
ENTITIES].
9 Id. at 7–8, 11.
10 Id. at 13.
11 See id. at 6.
12 One Small Step to Protect Human Heritage in Space Act, S. 1694, 116th
Cong. § 3(b)(1) (as passed by Senate, July 18, 2019); H.R. 3766, 116th Cong. (as
referred to H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., July 16, 2019).
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sites with careless expeditions and landing sites may be dese-
crated so that the items can be sold. A Russian Lunakhod lunar
rover has already been sold at auction to a private party, though
it has not yet been moved from its original position on the
Moon.13
While national heritage legislation can protect space artifacts
from citizens of their own countries, there is currently no effec-
tive means in the present space law regime by which a country
can protect its heritage from other countries.14 Both California
and New Mexico have added Tranquility Base to their list of pro-
tected heritage sites.15 However, this solution, and those pro-
posed in the bill put forth to the U.S. House of Representatives,
only serve to restrict the activities of a small subset of the poten-
tial visitors to the Moon. Though the Senate bill calls for the
President to initiate negotiations for a binding international
agreement, there is still a long road from this bill to a potential
agreement.16 A solution is needed to prevent the damage, de-
struction, loss, or private appropriation of our cultural heritage
in space.
B. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL HERITAGE
The United Nations (U.N.) Educational, Scientific, and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) website defines heritage as “our
legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass
on to future generations” and states that cultural heritage is an
“irreplaceable source[ ]” of inspiration.17 The Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Ex-
port and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Illicit
Transfer Convention) defines “cultural property” as “property
which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated
by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehis-
tory, history, literature, art or science and which belongs to the
13 John Catchpole, In Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the Last Apollo
Lunar Mission: Future History, 39 SPACEFLIGHT 416, 416 (1997).
14 See Dirk H.R. Spennemann, Extreme Cultural Tourism: From Antarctica to the
Moon, 34 ANNALS TOURISM RES. 898, 907–08 (2007).
15 Kenneth Chang, To Preserve History on the Moon, Visitors Are Asked to Tread
Lightly, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/10/sci-
ence/space/a-push-for-historic-preservation-on-the-moon.html [https://
perma.cc/6AJS-6Y8X].
16 One Small Step Act, S. 1694 § 2(b)(3).
17 About World Heritage, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/about/ [https:/
/perma.cc/G7YZ-XV9G] (last visited Aug. 24, 2019).
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following categories.”18 These categories include “property relat-
ing to history, including the history of science and technology
and military and social history, to the life of national leaders,
thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national impor-
tance.”19 The Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Conven-
tion) designates both monuments “which are of outstanding
universal value from the point of view of history, art or science”
and “works of man or the combined works of nature and man,
and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstand-
ing universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or
anthropological point of view” as cultural heritage.20 Artifacts of
space exploration could fit cleanly into these definitions, not-
withstanding the fact that they are at rest outside the territory of
any state and indeed are within the “province of all mankind.”21
Unfortunately, some or all provisions of the key multilateral
treaties are tied specifically to the territory of a contracting state,
thus eliminating the possibility of direct application to an outer
space context.22
C. WHAT IS A SPACE OBJECT?
The definition of the term “space object” is critical to under-
standing the issues discussed in this Article, particularly given
that rules regarding state jurisdiction, registration, and liability
function primarily by reference to this term.23 Likewise, it is crit-
ical to first understand which objects comprise space objects
before determining which space objects may be classified as
space heritage.
18 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231[hereinafter Illicit Transfer Convention].
19 Id.
20 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage art. 1, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter
World Heritage Convention].
21 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. 1.
22 See generally UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, 2421 U.N.T.S. 457 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention];
World Heritage Convention, supra note 20; Illicit Transfer Convention, supra
note 18; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict and Regulations for the Execution of the Said Convention, May
14, 1954, 36 U.S.T. 2279, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention of
1954].
23 BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 463 (1997).
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The term “object launched into outer space” or “space object”
is used by the Outer Space Treaty to refer to articles that may be
launched into space.24 Article XII uses the terms “stations, instal-
lations, equipment and space vehicles,”25 though this use is nar-
rower in scope than other references to space objects, as it is
intended to limit the range of objects on celestial bodies that
other parties will have a right to visit. The Outer Space Treaty
uses the term “objects” frequently,26 but the diversity of termi-
nology “seems to indicate that no consideration was given to the
uniformity of terminology by the UN-COPUOS” (Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space).27 The Return and Rescue
Agreement uses the terms “space object” and “spacecraft” for a
space object carrying personnel.28
The Liability Convention is, from a chronological perspective,
the first of the space conventions to provide a definition of the
term “space object,” though the definition is self-referential.29
There, the term is defined to include “component parts of a
space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”30
The Registration Convention utilizes an identical definition.31
Both of these two conventions consistently use the term “space
object.”32
The Moon Agreement, however, uses the terms personnel, ve-
hicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations,33 rather
than space object, except with regard to landing on and launch-
ing from the Moon and to aggression conducted from the Moon
to other objects.34 The question remains as to “whether the vari-
24 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, arts. VII–VIII, X.
25 Id. art. XII.
26 Id. arts. IV, VII–VIII.
27 IMRE ANTHONY CSABAFI, THE CONCEPT OF STATE JURISDICTION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL SPACE LAW 11 (1971).
28 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space arts. 1–5, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T.
7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Return and Rescue Agreement].
29 See Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects art. I(d), Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention].
30 Id.
31 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space art. I(b),
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration
Convention].
32 See id.; Liability Convention, supra note 29.
33 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies arts. 3.4, 8.2(b), 9, 12, 15, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Moon Agreement].
34 Id. arts. 3.2, 8.2(a), 13.
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ous items enumerated there are ‘space objects’ and, if so,
whether they are separate and independent space objects dis-
tinct in legal identity from the space object that brought these
items to the moon.”35 It seems most likely that these terms were
used to provide additional granularity for certain types of space
objects, such as creating rules with respect to particular catego-
ries of objects, rather than excluding them from the meaning of
“space object” entirely. This resolution of the question regard-
ing the definition of space object as contained in the Moon
Agreement is largely moot given the small number of ratifica-
tions, which do not include any of the major space powers.36
In light of the shifting of terminology in the Outer Space
Treaty, “[o]ne wonders . . . whether there are objects launched
into outer space that are not ‘space objects’, and whether the
two expressions ‘space objects’ and ‘objects launched into outer
space’ are in fact coterminous.”37 Given the consistency with
which the term “space object” is applied in both the Liability
Convention and Registration Convention (which are more re-
cent agreements than the Outer Space Treaty)38 and the fact
that none of the space treaties provide any insight into the dif-
ferences between “objects launched into space,” “space objects,”
or any other variant of the term, any distinction appears to be
one without intent.39
The term space object can be abstruse and lead to mis-
informed interpretations.40 Despite the attempt at providing a
definition of the term, the Liability and Registration Conven-
tions merely provide some insight as to what can be included in
the definition but not what should be excluded.41
35 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 503.
36 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Sub-
comm. on Its Fifty-Eighth Session, Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2019, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2019/
CRP.3, at 5–10 (Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter COPUOS, Agreement Status].
37 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 493.
38 See generally Registration Convention, supra note 31; Liability Convention,
supra note 29; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4.
39 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 495.
40 E.R.C. VAN BOGAERT, ASPECTS OF SPACE LAW 118 (1986).
41 “The expression ‘space object’ is . . . not specifically defined in any of the
conventions relating to outer space established under the auspices of the United
Nations, notwithstanding efforts to do so in the negotiations leading to the Liabil-
ity Convention and the Registration Convention.” CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23,
at 464.
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Following the rule definition fiat per genus proximum et differen-
tiam specificam, “object” is the general term which is modified by
“space”42 and, in the context of the space treaties, must also be
modified by and include “its component parts.”43 “Insofar as
stray objects are concerned, the various treaties consistently in-
clude component parts.”44 Therefore, the term “space object”
automatically includes component parts unless contextually in-
dicated otherwise.45 Likewise, payload is “ ‘property on board’ a
space object, forming part of that space object and would not be
an independent space object. This would in fact apply to all
items of property on board.”46 This explanation resolves the is-
sue regarding waste left behind by the Apollo missions; such
items are included within the meaning of “space object.”
“From the legal standpoint, ‘space object’ is, in current prac-
tice, the generic term used to cover spacecraft, satellites, and in
fact anything that human beings launch or attempt to launch
into space, including their components and launch vehicles, as
well as parts thereof.”47 With regard to the space treaties, Ste-
phen Gorove considers that the most likely acceptable defini-
tion of “space object” would be “an object launched or
attempted to be launched in orbit around the earth or be-
yond.”48 He adds that inserting the phrase “or a part of it” after
“object” would be in accordance with the definitions provided in
the Liability Convention and Registration Convention.49
According to Manfred Lachs, however, the definition of space
object should “include any object designed: 1. to be placed: (a)
in orbit as a satellite of the earth, the moon, or any other celes-
tial body; (b) on the moon or any other celestial body; 2. to
traverse some other course to, in or through outer space.”50 Per-
haps the most suitable definition of the term would combine
42 Gyula Ga´l, Space Objects - “While in Outer Space,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
THIRTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 84 (Am. Inst. of Aero-
nautics & Astronautics ed., 1994).
43 CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 11.
44 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 500.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 502.
47 Id. at 463.
48 Stephen Gorove, Evaluating Policy Alternatives Pertaining to the Legal Definition
of “Space Object,” in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 266, 267 (Am. Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronautics ed., 1995).
49 Id.
50 MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPO-
RARY LAW-MAKING 69 (1972).
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both Gorove’s and Lachs’s definitions—any object or a part of it
designed to be placed: in orbit as a satellite of the earth or any
celestial body; on any celestial body; or to traverse some other
course to, in, or through outer space.51 Of course, the difficulty
arising from any of these definitions is the lack of a line of de-
marcation as to where air space ends and outer space begins,
which is an issue beyond the scope of this Article.52
When does a space object become a space object? Under the
definitions discussed above, the fact that an object is either de-
signed to be launched or attempted to be launched into outer
space is sufficient. While certain authors have stated the view
that “merely because a certain man-made object is or has been
at an altitude which is indisputably considered to by [sic] in
outer space is not, by itself, a sufficient justification for it to be
legally qualified as a space object,”53 it seems that unless there is
an obvious distinction, any attempt to create such a division
would only result in unnecessary ambiguity and confusion, par-
ticularly given the inherent inclusion of component parts. It is
more logical to include all objects that have, in fact, traversed
outer space within the definition. “[T]he term space object
designates any object which humans launch, attempt to launch
or have launched into outer space. It embraces satellites, space-
craft, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, installations
and other constructions, including their components, as well as
their launch vehicles and parts thereof.”54
“Does a space object ever cease to be a space object, and if so,
when? . . . One can probably say that they do not cease to be
such until perhaps they have been dismantled or otherwise dis-
posed of.”55 In other words, “there is no apparent time limit.”56
The status of an object as a space object “is not affected by [its]
presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by [its] return
to the Earth,” as stated in the Outer Space Treaty.57 At this
51 See id.; Gorove, supra note 48, at 267.
52 For discussion of this issue, see GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND JURIS-
DICTION IN THE AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE: LEGAL CRITERIA FOR SPATIAL DELIMITA-
TION (2012).
53 Ga´l, supra note 42, at 85 (citing A.D. Terekhov, Passage of Space Objects
Through Foreign Airspace, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 52 (Am. Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronautics ed.,
1988)).
54 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 464.
55 Id. at 504–05.
56 Id. at 505.
57 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VIII.
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point, these provisions “may be regarded as merely declaratory
of the position under general international law.”58
D. WHAT IS SPACE HERITAGE?
The lack of agreed upon definitions in international law for
the terms “cultural heritage,” “cultural property,” or “cultural
heritage of mankind” creates difficulty in terms of defining ex-
actly which space objects could comprise heritage.59 Even within
the UNESCO conventions, there is no common definition of
cultural heritage or cultural property; each convention uses the
definition most applicable to the specific concepts enshrined
within the scope of that convention.60 The individual definitions
in each relevant convention are discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion III to determine whether those conventions can be applied
as is to space heritage. As the concept of heritage is not men-
tioned anywhere in the Outer Space Treaty, providing no addi-
tional insight,61 it is necessary to define the concept for the
purposes of this Article. Merely defining the terms “culture” and
“heritage” and using them to modify one another creates a defi-
nition that is far too broad to be useful.62
Over time, cultural heritage has shifted from a concept ap-
plied primarily only to “high culture”—such as great works of
art and architecture—to a broader term that includes more
mundane artifacts that express the identity of a society gener-
ally.63 There is no doubt at this stage that scientifically or histori-
cally important materials can be included within the concept of
cultural heritage.64 These are the categories of heritage into
which space heritage would fit.
Cultural heritage is “a form of inheritance to be kept in safe-
keeping and handed down to future generations.”65 The protec-
tion of cultural heritage is an attempt to prevent “the eternal
58 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 466.
59 See Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 61, 63
(2000).
60 Manlio Frigo, Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage: A “Battle of Concepts” in
International Law?, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 367, 368–69, 375 (2004).
61 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4; Walsh, supra note 3, at 236.
62 Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, supra note 59, at 67–68.
63 Id. at 72.
64 See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 22, art. 2; Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Architectural Heritage of Europe art. 1, Oct. 3, 1985, C.E.T.S. 121;
World Heritage Convention, supra note 20, art. 1; Illicit Transfer Convention,
supra note 18, art. 1; Hague Convention of 1954, supra note 22, art. 1.
65 Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, supra note 59, at 83–84.
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silence created by the destruction of culture.”66 Thus, cultural
heritage is a means of attaining immortality for those who create
it and a means of understanding one’s past for those who con-
sume it; it is a form of survival.67
Heritage creates a perception of . . . something to be cared for
and cherished. These cultural manifestations have come down to
us from the past; they are our legacy from our ancestors. There is
today a broad acceptance of a duty to pass them on to our succes-
sors, augmented by the creations of the present.68
This concept of inheritance that is kept safe for future genera-
tions is the first element of any definition of the concept of cul-
tural heritage.69
Cultural heritage provides a “deliberate continuity,” repre-
senting the desired connection that a political society wishes to
maintain and hand down.70 In this way, it is part of a group’s
shared identity. This symbolic linkage with the shared identity of
a people is a second essential element of cultural heritage, estab-
lishing the emotional value of the object or site.71 The law serves
a gatekeeping function with regard to heritage objects; by select-
ing, categorizing, and valuing objects, the law defines heritage
and attempts to guarantee appropriate treatment.72 “Not every-
thing can, or should, be preserved. The choice depends on nu-
merous factors: the nature of the material in question, its rarity;
its significance as illustrating development of the human
condition.”73
Cultural heritage is also “a base from which progress in cul-
tural achievement becomes possible.”74 Given the significant lag
in manned space exploration since the Apollo missions, the pro-
tection of this solid base (literally and figuratively) is critical to
ensuring a renewed commitment to outer space activities.
66 Manfred Lachs, The Defences of Culture, 37 MUSEUM INT’L 167, 168 (1985).
67 John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, 77 CALIF. L.
REV. 339, 347–49 (1989).
68 Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’?,
1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 311 (1992).
69 See Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, supra note 59, at 69, 83–84.
70 RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF CULTURE 187 (Schocken Books
1982) (1981).
71 See Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, supra note 59, at 84.
72 JOHN CARMAN, VALUING ANCIENT THINGS: ARCHAEOLOGY AND LAW 40 (1996).
73 Prott & O’Keefe, supra note 68, at 309.
74 Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, supra note 67, at 354.
312 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
1. Space Heritage Objects
Much like space debris, articles of space heritage are still
space objects; “an artificial satellite in a museum that has been
to outer space and back probably still ranks as a space object.”75
Contrary to space debris, however, heritage objects are said to
be durable in that they “are deemed to have a permanent exis-
tence and constantly increasing value”—this characteristic dis-
tinguishes heritage from objects which instead decrease in value
and thus are reduced to “rubbish.”76
Given the large volume of man-made orbiting items and
equipment fragments, it can be difficult to consider such utilita-
rian space objects as heritage deserving of preservation.77 It is
clear, however, that certain space objects should qualify as heri-
tage within the context described above. Many of these objects
are already in museums (such as the Space Shuttle Discovery,
which is on display at the Smithsonian Institute),78 but this Arti-
cle is concerned with the objects that remain in outer space or
on celestial bodies. Objects such as the lunar laser ranging re-
troflector array from the Apollo 11 mission, along with other
instruments placed on the Moon’s surface during the initial
stages of lunar exploration, including the 189 individually cata-
logued items deposited by Apollo 15, should be preserved for
their historic importance.79 Likewise, the rovers that have been
placed on the surface of Mars should be preserved for their his-
toric value. Generally speaking, those objects that represent ma-
jor space “firsts” or leaps forward in space technology should be
preserved as heritage objects.
In practical terms, however, the term “space heritage” would
apply primarily to those objects landed on celestial bodies for
the purposes of in situ preservation.80 In situ preservation of
space heritage objects actually in the vacuum of space should
only be undertaken in circumstances where the placement and
75 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 505.
76 CARMAN, supra note 72, at 29.
77 Walsh, supra note 3, at 235.
78 See Robert Z. Pearlman, Space Shuttle Discovery Enters Smithsonian for Museum
Display, SPACE.COM (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.space.com/15339-space-shut
tle-discovery-smithsonian-museum.html [https://perma.cc/5QT7-J3JR].
79 PROTECTING & PRESERVING APOLLO PROGRAM LUNAR LANDING SITES & ARTI-
FACTS, supra note 2, at 1–2; Gerda Horneck & Charles S. Cockell, Planetary Parks –
Suggestion for a Targeted Planetary Protection Approach, in PROTECTING THE ENVIRON-
MENT OF CELESTIAL BODIES 45, 47 (Mahulena Hofmann et al. eds., 2010).
80 See, e.g., Horneck & Cockell, supra note 79, at 47.
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natural movement of such an object will not interfere with other
space activities. Given that objects in space (not on a celestial
body) are not motionless, they are likely to present a much
higher danger to other space objects than those on celestial
bodies. Thus, for the safety of both the heritage object and any
other objects operating in the same vicinity, such heritage
should be relocated for preservation. The preservation of the
heritage’s context is also not as important in the vacuum of
outer space, since the object is in motion and therefore has
likely moved from its original position. Thus, there is not much
in the way of context to be preserved. This situation starkly con-
trasts with heritage objects on celestial bodies that are stationary
and can easily be disturbed by changes to the landscape from
the impact of landings, rover tracks, and footsteps.
Fundamentally, however, it is the responsibility of the launch-
ing state or the launching authority to determine a space ob-
ject’s status as heritage. Each state retains jurisdiction,
ownership, and control of the object, as well as liability for any
damage caused by the object, and thus is responsible for its
fate.81
There is extensive evidence that, generally speaking, people
care about cultural objects, including: (1) the popularity of mu-
seums; (2) the existence of laws regarding preservation, conser-
vation, and export; and (3) the dialogue about cultural heritage
in both national and international law.82 The popularity of mu-
seums displaying space heritage objects reflects that people feel
a concern about this form of heritage in particular.83
2. Space Heritages Sites
In selecting what constitutes heritage, the law delineates be-
tween heritage objects and heritage sites. While whole objects or
their parts are classified as heritage objects, the context in which
these individual components exist can create sites.84 “[T]he site
comprising a vehicle or vessel (so long as it is of ‘public inter-
est’)” can be classified as just such a site.85
There are several sites on the surface of the Moon that are of
unique value due to their connection to early lunar explora-
81 For further discussion of this topic, see infra sections II.C.4, II.C.6.
82 See Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, supra note 67, at 343.
83 Walsh, supra note 3, at 235.
84 Cf. CARMAN, supra note 72, at 120.
85 Id. at 187.
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tion.86 The Apollo 11 landing site provides “a complete record
of the first human activity on any celestial object outside of
earth. . . . This is the ultimate heritage site, both in terms of
significance of humanity as a whole, but also in terms of heri-
tage preservation as a single site.”87 There are also five addi-
tional Apollo manned landing sites that should be considered
heritage sites.88
Each Apollo lunar landing site retains the landing stage (base) of
the lunar modules (LM), instruments packages (EASEP or AL-
SEP), the lunar rovers (Apollo 15–17 only), TV and film camera
equipment, scientific sampling equipment jettisoned after sam-
ples had been collected, as well as sundry parts of equipment. In
addition there is unneeded equipment, such as components of
the space suits used by the astronauts during their Moon walks as
well as expended food packaging and containers of human body
waste.89
From this description, it should be clear that the context of
such a site, providing a clear map of movements and activities, is
arguably as important, if not more important, than the objects
located at the site. In the words of Francis Lyall, “it makes no
sense to protect artefacts without protecting the site of their lo-
cation.”90 The determination of space heritage sites will have to
be performed on a case-by-case basis, balancing the value of the
site with the freedom of access to outer space.
II. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW
International space law governs any cultural heritage that falls
within its regimen. Thus, in conjunction with any relevant cul-
tural heritage law (which is discussed in Section III of this Arti-
cle), it provides the legal regime currently applicable to the
protection of such space heritage. “[S]pace law, as it now exists,
is not an independent legal system. It is merely a functional clas-
sification of those rules of international law and of municipal
law relating to outer space.”91 The sources of space law are the
86 Horneck & Cockell, supra note 79, at 47.
87 Spennemann, Extreme Cultural Tourism, supra note 14, at 909.
88 See id. at 912.
89 Dirk H.R. Spennemann, The Ethics of Treading on Neil Armstrong’s Footprints,
20 SPACE POL’Y 279, 282 (2004).
90 Francis Lyall, OST Art. IX, Improvements: Cultural and Natural Heritage Ele-
ments, 53 PROC. INT’L INST. SPACE L. 657, 661 (2010).
91 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 383.
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same as those found in international law generally.92 These
sources are articulated in the first paragraph of Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.93
Thus, treaties, customary international law, and general princi-
ples of law act as the primary sources of space law, while judicial
decisions and the writings of jurists act as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
A. TREATY LAW
The Outer Space Treaty, the oldest and most comprehensive
of the space treaties, is the cornerstone of space law.94 This
Treaty has been ratified by 109 states and signed by an addi-
tional 23, demonstrating its nearly universal acceptance.95 All of
the major spacefaring states have acceded to this Treaty.96 Arti-
cles I, II, and III of the Outer Space Treaty are considered to be
fundamental principles of space law.97 It is Article III that estab-
lishes the unquestionable applicability of international law to
the realm of outer space. This Article states that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the explora-
tion and use of outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining in-
ternational peace and security and promoting international co-
operation and understanding.98
92 See, e.g., P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND OUTER
SPACE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 7–9 (2003).
93 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
94 See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 53 (2009).
95 COPUOS, Agreement Status, supra note 36, at 10.
96 Id. at 5–10.
97 See I.H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, Space Law as It Effects Domestic Law, 7 J.
SPACE L. 39, 41–42 (1979); see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 94, at 53.
98 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. III.
316 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
Therefore, in any discussion of space law, it is important to note
other relevant provisions in international law that may have an
impact. It is also due to this provision also that we can consider
international cultural heritage law as relevant to outer space.
In addition to international law generally, it is important to
consider that “[t]he law relating to the conclusion, validity, ef-
fect, interpretation and discharge of treaties and other interna-
tional agreements applies to treaties and agreements covering
space matters.”99 Though the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention) came into force after the drafting
of the outer space treaties, it can still be applied to the extent
that the principles enshrined therein represent rules of custom-
ary international law.100 The International Court of Justice has
confirmed that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, the
relevant provisions regarding treaty interpretation, represent
customary international law.101
The Return and Rescue Agreement, Liability Convention, and
Registration Convention all elaborate specific aspects of the
Outer Space Treaty. These conventions, with ninety-eight,
ninety-six, and sixty-nine ratifications, respectively,102 provide
more detailed rules relating to return and rescue, liability, and
registration requirements. Unlike the Outer Space Treaty, the
Return and Rescue Agreement does not offer much benefit to
non-spacefaring states,103 which may account for the small dis-
parity in ratifications between the two treaties.104
The Moon Agreement, the most recent and least subscribed
of the outer space treaties (with a mere eighteen ratifica-
99 C. WILFRED JENKS, SPACE LAW 205 (1965).
100 See PANOS MERKOURIS, TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE VIENNA CONVEN-
TION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: 30 YEARS ON, at 5 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds.,
2010); Steven Freeland & Ram Jakhu, Article II, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON
SPACE LAW: OUTER SPACE TREATY 44, 48 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., 2009); see also
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31–32, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
101 See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 94 (July 9); Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 33 (Feb. 15); Territorial Dispute (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. Rep. 19, ¶ 41 (Feb. 3).
102 COPUOS, Agreement Status, supra note 36, at 10.
103 Roy S.K. Lee, Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 53, 73
(Nandasiri Jasentuliyana & Roy S.K. Lee eds., 1979).
104 See COPUOS, Agreement Status, supra note 36, at 10.
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tions),105 provides the least value in terms of binding rules of
treaty law. The provisions contained within the Agreement bind
only those eighteen parties. Somewhat misleadingly, the Moon
Agreement does, in fact, apply to all celestial bodies in the solar
system for which no specific international agreement has been
reached.106 Thus, for example, the Moon Agreement would ap-
ply to the proposed activities of the Netherlands, a state which is
party to the Agreement,107 on Mars.108
B. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary law, as a component of international law, has a
role to play in space law as well. “ ‘[I]nternational custom’
means really that part of the applicable rules and norms of the
international legal system that is not covered by treaties . . . or
the general principles of law . . . .”109 The two elements of cus-
tomary international law are state practice and opinio juris.110
“Opinio juris is the view that is held by, or that may be said, with
effect opposable to that state, to be held by, a state as to what the
law is at any given moment.”111
For the purposes of customary international law under sub-
paragraph (b) of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, acceptance by a generality of states is
sufficient to form customary international law; acceptance by all
states is not required.112 In an area where few states have had the
capability to demonstrate a consistent practice, the practice of
those prevalent states able to demonstrate such practice is suffi-
cient to form the basis of a rule of customary law.113 “As regards
the question who constitutes the prevalent or dominant section
of any society, it may be said that this consists basically of those
105 Id.
106 Moon Agreement, supra note 33, art. 1(1).
107 COPUOS, Agreement Status, supra note 36, at 8.
108 Press Release, Mars One, Mars One Will Settle Men on Mars in 2023 (May
31, 2012), https://www.mars-one.com/news/press-releases/mars-one-will-settle-
men-on-mars-in-2023 [https://perma.cc/3LKF-W6SV].
109 Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in
THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSO-
PHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 513, 513 (R. St.J. Macdonald & Douglas M. Johnston
eds., 1983).
110 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 131, 139 (2d
Cir. 2010).
111 Cheng, Custom, supra note 109, at 548.
112 See id. at 549; Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 139.
113 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 65 (July 8); VAUGHN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (2007).
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who have the intention of making their will prevail and the abil-
ity to do so.”114 According to Dr. Bin Cheng, “what is critical is
whether it has been accepted by those among the states con-
cerned which have both the ability and the will to uphold it,
whenever the rule is, to their detriment, not being observed.”115
With regard to subsidiary sources of international law, “the
more the field is covered by decided cases the less becomes the
authority of commentators and jurists.”116 The corollary, there-
fore, is also true: the less the field is covered by decided cases,
the authority of commentators and jurists is greater.117 Thus,
where there is very little caselaw in the area of space, the impor-
tance of jurists’ writings is greater and can be further reliably
utilized.
In a field as relatively young as space law, how does customary
international law come into being? “[T]he adoption of a soft law
instrument is only the first step toward the establishment of a
binding legal regime.”118 The International Court of Justice has
recognized that a treaty provision can accurately reflect custom-
ary international law under two circumstances: when it codifies
existing customary international law, or when such provision
crystallizes, emerging as customary law.119 Many of the provi-
sions of the Outer Space Treaty satisfy these requirements. The
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space created binding
norms, which were subsequently enumerated and elaborated in
the Outer Space Treaty.120 Through direct consent provided by
states in the passing of this Declaration, along with the total ab-
114 Cheng, Custom, supra note 109, at 546.
115 Id. at 547.
116 The Kronprinsessan Margareta [1921] 1 AC 486, 495 (PC).
117 VIRGILIU POP, WHO OWNS THE MOON?: EXTRATERRESTRIAL ASPECTS OF LAND
AND MINERAL RESOURCES OWNERSHIP 44 (2008).
118 Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heri-
tage as a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209, 1227 (2004).
119 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. Rep. 40, ¶ 63 (Feb. 20); LOWE, supra note 113, at 83.
120 LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 50, at 138; Bin Cheng, United
Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN
J. INT’L L. 23, 28 (1965); Ram Jakhu & Maria Buzdugan, Development of the Natural
Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Economic and Legal Aspects, 6 ASTRO-
POLITICS 201, 217 (2008); Ricky J. Lee, Reconciling International Space Law with the
Commercial Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 194, 204
(2000); Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of
International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L. 22, 33 (1985); Ivan A. Vlasic, The
Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 507, 507–08 (1967).
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sence of protest, spacefaring states have crafted binding norms
of customary international law.121
Some standards, such as UN-COPUOS Space Debris Mitiga-
tion Guidelines, have also begun to play an important role both
for cultural heritage law and space law. “While standards are not
traditionally mentioned amongst the sources of international
law . . . they have become more influential in shaping state con-
duct in regard to international relations.”122
C. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW FOR HERITAGE IN
SPACE
1. Non-Appropriation
The principle of non-appropriation as articulated in Article II
of the Outer Space Treaty is considered a norm of customary
international law.123 It has also been argued that this provision is
a jus cogens norm, or peremptory norm, of international law.124
The text of Article II is as follows: “Outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national ap-
propriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupa-
tion, or by any other means.”125 In international law,
“[o]ccupation, as an original mode of acquisition of state terri-
tory, is effected through taking possession of, and establishing
an administration over territory in the name of and for the ac-
quiring state.”126 Thus, the use and administration over territory
in outer space will not substantiate the acquisition of that terri-
121 LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 50, at 138.
122 Valentina Sara Vadi, Investing in Culture: Underwater Cultural Heritage and In-
ternational Investment Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 853, 866 (2009).
123 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 465; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 94, at 71;
POP, supra note 117, at 38; Freeland & Jakhu, supra note 100, at 45–46; Eilene
Galloway, Maintaining International Space Cooperation for Peaceful Uses, 30 J. SPACE L.
311, 312 (2004); Ricky J. Lee & Felicity K. Eylward, Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty and Human Presence on Celestial Bodies: Prohibition of State Sovereignty, Exclusive
Property Rights, or Both?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 95, 98–99 (Am. Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronautics ed.,
2005); F. Kenneth Schwetje, Protecting Space Assets: A Legal Analysis of Keep-Out
Zones, 15 J. SPACE L. 131, 140–41 (1987).
124 CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 47; Freeland & Jakhu, supra note 100, at 55;
Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, with a Projected List, 7 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 609, 625–26 (1977); see also C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 458 (1964); JENKS, SPACE LAW, supra note 99, at
200; Cestmir Cepelka & Jamie H.C. Gilmour, The Application of General Interna-
tional Law in Outer Space, 36 J. AIR L. & COM. 30, 47 (1970).
125 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. II.
126 Cepelka & Gilmour, supra note 124, at 32.
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tory; “no amount of the use of outer space will ever suffice to
justify, from a legal viewpoint, a claim of ownership rights over
the whole, or any part of outer space . . . .”127
De facto appropriation still may be a concern even in the ab-
sence of de jure appropriation. “National controls for long peri-
ods and considerable stretches of lunar territory will pose a
threat to the very principle of non-appropriation of lunar terri-
tory for national purposes and thus to the very basis of the pub-
lic order or the earth-space arena.”128 There are “legal
complications arising from prolonged occupation of, particu-
larly, parts of celestial bodies through exploration or use. Such
occupation can easily come into conflict with the ‘free access’
principle which is inherent in the concept of non-appropriation
. . . .”129 This is precisely the concern with regard to heritage
destined for in situ preservation on a celestial body; it will result
in perpetual occupation of the surface on which the heritage
rests.
While use does not constitute appropriation in violation of
Article II, neither does symbolic activity.130 Thus, symbolic state-
ments regarding lunar sites as U.S. national heritage in the
Apollo Act should likewise not represent appropriation. In or-
der to constitute appropriation, both elements of factual posses-
sion and intention to possess would have to be met.131 This
interpretation dovetails with Lachs’s reading that Article II pro-
hibits the creation of titles.132 Even such extensive occupation of
outer space as described above cannot constitute an appropria-
tion or confer ownership over portions of space or celestial
bodies.133
Article 12 of the Moon Agreement also clarifies that the place-
ment of stations or facilities does not create a right of ownership
with regard to the surface of the Moon; therefore, extended or
indefinite occupation of an area of the surface is explicitly per-
127 Freeland & Jakhu, supra note 100, at 53.
128 S. BHATT, LEGAL CONTROLS OF OUTER SPACE: LAW, FREEDOM AND RESPONSI-
BILITY 155 (1973).
129 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 401.
130 See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 789
(1963).
131 See Johanna Catena, Legal Matters Relating to the “Settlement” of “Outposts” on
the Moon, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 414, 418 (Am. Inst. of Aeronautics & Astronautics ed., 2004).
132 LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 50, at 43.
133 See ODUNTAN, supra note 52, at 189; Freeland & Jakhu, supra note 100, at
53–54.
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missible and would not constitute an appropriation.134 Despite
the limited ratification of the Moon Agreement,135 this provision
appears to accurately reflect the intention of the non-appropria-
tion provision of the Outer Space Treaty, particularly when the
views of prominent jurists are taken into consideration.136 In
sum, the in situ preservation of space heritage should not run
afoul of the space law principle of non-appropriation.
2. Freedom of Access and Use
The freedom of access and use of outer space, as articulated
within Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, is a fundamental rule
of both treaty-based and customary space law.137 It states: “Outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination
of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with inter-
national law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celes-
tial bodies.”138 Therefore, it is impermissible for one state to
interfere with another state’s free access or use of outer space.139
In the words of Cepelka and Gilmour, “The inherent limita-
tion on free access is its exercise. Like any other right in this
sphere, it cannot be regarded as absolute and must be per-
formed with reasonable regard to the interest of others exercis-
ing a like right;”140 likewise, it must conform with other
limitations imposed by international law.141
It is argued that exclusive rights to outer space or celestial
bodies are not permitted in accordance with the right of free
access.142 While exclusivity is not permitted with regard to land,
exclusivity can be exercised with regard to stations and facili-
ties.143 “A state cannot claim any exclusive right over a maritime
134 See Stephen Gorove, Property Rights in Outer Space: Focus on the Proposed Moon
Treaty, 2 J. SPACE L. 27, 29 (1974).
135 See COPUOS, Agreement Status, supra note 36, at 10.
136 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 94, at 71.
137 See Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space, supra note 120, at 28–29.
138 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I.
139 See, e.g., Edwin W. Paxson III, Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration:
Space Law and Economic Development, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 487, 492 (1993); Daniel
A. Porras, Comment, The “Common Heritage” of Outer Space: Equal Benefits for Most of
Mankind, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 143, 172 (2006).
140 Cepelka & Gilmour, supra note 124, at 33.
141 Jakhu & Buzdugan, supra note 120, at 216–17.
142 Cody Tucker, Lunar Rights: How Current International Law Addresses Rights to
Use and Exploit Lunar Resources, the Practical Difficulties Attached, and Solutions for the
Future, 34 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 591, 601 (2009).
143 See Lee & Eylward, supra note 123, at 100.
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belt circumventing either an anchored lightship or a lighthouse
in the open sea. Similarly, no such claim can be made over any
area of terra firma surrounding a landed spacecraft or installa-
tions constructed on a celestial body.”144 Thus, there is no inher-
ent right to exclusive use of a zone surrounding a facility in
international law.
Safety and security of space activities and space objects must,
however, be taken into consideration. While establishment of
safety zones may serve a legitimate interest in protecting objec-
tives or activities, “such claims ought to be rare and should not
ignore the right of states to inclusive use.”145 Though the preser-
vation of cultural heritage certainly does not qualify as “secur-
ity,” such an allowance for exclusive use does open up the
possibility of exclusive use in certain circumstances. As the pres-
ervation of humanity’s cultural heritage can be considered a
benefit to all humankind in accordance with Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty, it may be a permissible exclusive use of a
section of celestial body surface area. There may also be mecha-
nisms in place that can mitigate such exclusive use, such as Arti-
cle XII of the Outer Space Treaty, discussed in further detail
below.146
Whether or not there is a right to exclusive use of outer space,
“there is no general international law rule giving the right of
free access to those areas under the quasi-territorial jurisdiction
of states such as any space objects in outer space, including ce-
lestial bodies.”147 The type of jurisdiction exercised under these
circumstances is functional rather than exclusive; functional ju-
risdiction is limited to the length of time and extent necessary
for a state to secure its rights with regard to its outer space activi-
ties.148 Thus, a state is permitted to exercise functional jurisdic-
tion over areas of the lunar surface as necessary for the relevant
space activity, which could include preservation of space
heritage.149
3. Reciprocal Visits
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty provides for a system of
reciprocal visits to space installations:
144 Cepelka & Gilmour, supra note 124, at 35.
145 BHATT, supra note 128, at 83.
146 See infra section II.C.3.
147 Cepelka & Gilmour, supra note 124, at 35.
148 CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 131; ODUNTAN, supra note 52, at 225.
149 See infra section III.C.4.
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All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the
moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to representatives
of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.
Such representatives shall give reasonable advance notice of a
projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be
held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure
safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the
facility to be visited.150
While this provision has so far been untested, the Apollo equip-
ment and vehicles could be subject to such reciprocal visits in
the future. The question would become whether the dormant
nature and protection of these objects would outweigh the need
for a direct visit or making contact with the objects. “This provi-
sion . . . is designed principally to assure the non-military charac-
ter and use of stations, installations, equipment and space
vehicles on celestial bodies, although the requirement of com-
pulsory advance notice and the principle of reciprocity dilute
considerably the potency of the clause,”151 especially when com-
pared to its Antarctic Treaty forerunner, which opens installa-
tions and equipment to inspection at all times with no notice or
reciprocity requirement.152 Therefore, it may be possible to co-
ordinate “visits” that would not interfere with the protection of
the sites.
“The unsatisfactory manner in which the Treaty dealt with co-
operation on the Moon and other celestial bodies may be seen
from the fact that the opening up, to representatives of states
parties to the Treaty, of stations, equipment and space vehicles
is on a basis of reciprocity only.”153 Unfortunately, this weakness
also impacts whatever benefit may be provided in terms of cul-
tural heritage. Though such visits may help to mitigate issues
with exclusivity of use and provide benefits with regard to acces-
sibility of the cultural heritage of mankind, the requirement for
reciprocity could prove to be a stumbling block. “What is meant
by reciprocity and what the legal effects are vis-a`-vis member
states who do not have stations, equipment and space vehicles
on the Moon and other celestial bodies, are not dealt with” in
150 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. XII.
151 NICOLAS M. MATTE, SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW
321 (Nicolas Mateesco Matte ed., 1984).
152 See Antarctic Treaty art. VII, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
153 Nicolas M. Matte, Treaty Relating to the Moon, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW,
supra note 103, at 253, 254.
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the text of the article.154 Additionally, using the provision for
cultural heritage visits would not conform to the original intent
to allow inspections, although such an interpretation would pro-
mote cooperation in space activities.
4. Jurisdiction and Control
a. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty grants jurisdiction, con-
trol, and ownership over space objects located by a state beyond
its territory.155 This is the critical provision governing a state’s
jurisdiction over its space heritage. The first two sentences of
Article VIII are as follows:
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched
into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control
over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer
space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into
outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celes-
tial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their
presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their return
to the Earth.156
This provision is considered by Cheng to be declaratory of
customary international law that existed at the time the treaty
was drafted.157 Cheng also states that the jurisdiction and con-
trol provision of the Moon Agreement is applicable as a “mere
amplification” of the provision contained in the Outer Space
Treaty.158 The relevant text of the Moon Agreement is as follows:
“States Parties shall retain jurisdiction and control over their
personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installa-
tions on the moon. The ownership of space vehicles, equip-
ment, facilities, stations and installations shall not be affected by
their presence on the moon.”159 It seems clear that this provi-
sion merely enumerates what is considered a space object with
respect to the particularities of the Moon Agreement. Imre
Csabafi has even stated that “[a]s a rule of jus cogens, derived
from the principle of sovereign equality, every State has exclu-
154 Id.
155 Diederiks-Verschoor, supra note 97, at 42.
156 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VIII.
157 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 466–67.
158 Id. at 466.
159 Moon Agreement, supra note 33, art. 12(1).
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sive jurisdiction over its spacecraft, installations and personnel
therein.”160
So, what is jurisdiction? In the words of Sir Derek Bowett,
“[j]urisdiction is a manifestation of state sovereignty. It has been
defined as ‘the capacity of a state under international law to pre-
scribe or to enforce a rule of law.’”161 With respect to space law,
“[j]urisdiction and control include the power of such State to
legislate with respect to its space objects and the personnel on
board thereof.”162 Jurisdiction itself can be broken down into
two types of power: the power to “make laws and take decisions,”
known as jurisfaction; and the power “to implement and to en-
force” laws, regulations and decisions, known as jurisaction.163
Cheng describes the three types of jurisdiction: territorial ju-
risdiction (inapplicable in an outer space context due to the
non-appropriation principle), quasi-territorial jurisdiction (as-
serted over space objects, aircraft, and vessels), and personal ju-
risdiction (asserted over nationals).164 For the purposes of
personal jurisdiction, “nationality is a legal bond having as its
basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of exis-
tence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties.”165 This Article is primarily con-
cerned with quasi-territorial jurisdiction.
The decision in the Las Palmas arbitration describes the situa-
tion with regard to quasi-territorial sovereignty exercised be-
yond the bounds of territorial jurisdiction:
The fact that the functions of a State can be performed by any
State within a given zone is . . . precisely the characteristic feature
of the legal situation pertaining in those parts of the globe
which, like the high seas or lands without a master, cannot or do
not yet form the territory of a State.166
In certain cases, “extraterritorial jurisdiction of a sovereign state
may become imputable as a result of the factual or presumed
exercise of control.”167
160 CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 47.
161 D.W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority Over Activities and Re-
sources, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 109, at
555, 555.
162 HAANAPPEL, supra note 92, at 24.
163 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 622–23.
164 See id. at 622.
165 Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 23 (Apr. 6).
166 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
167 ODUNTAN, supra note 52, at 52.
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The registration referred to in Article VIII can be considered
a status of nationality.168 This granting of nationality may be
compared to the granting of nationality by a state over its flag
vessels on the high seas. This form of jurisdiction is “quasi-terri-
torial” jurisdiction because it is comparable to the jurisdiction of
sovereign states over their territory.169 It “applies not only to the
object as such, but also to all things and persons on board.”170
The Outer Space Treaty “protects the attribution of jurisdic-
tion on the basis of the national registry as well as the identifica-
tion of space objects as a way of securing the principle of liability
and the right to retrieve such objects.”171 The assumption of re-
sponsibility and liability for space objects is predicated on an
assumption of jurisdiction over such objects.172 Both principles
of the right to the return of a space object and of liability for a
space object are discussed in greater detail in section II.C.5. as
key issues for space heritage.
One important factor to note with regard to space heritage is
that “the ‘State of registry’ . . . has a right to require other States
to refrain from interfering with the direction and supervision of
the object . . . .”173 Thus, states can regulate, within the bounds
of space law, which activities will interfere with the direction and
supervision of their space heritage. While, with regard to terres-
trial heritage, some states will enact legislation to declare cul-
tural objects as state property to protect such objects,174 this
action is fortunately not necessary with regard to space heritage
due to the effects of Article VI and Article VIII of the Outer
Space Treaty.175
b. Abandonment
The jurisdiction, control, and ownership of space objects as
established in Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty is perma-
168 See VAN BOGAERT, supra note 40, at 115.
169 See S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 25
(Sept. 7).
170 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 467.
171 Aldo Armando Cocca, Registration of Space Objects, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE
LAW, supra note 103, at 173, 187–88.
172 See Stephen Gorove, Criminal Jurisdiction in Outer Space, 6 INT’L L. 313, 316
(1972).
173 LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 50, at 69.
174 See John Henry Merryman, The Nation and the Object, 3 INT’L J. CULTURAL
PROP. 61, 62 (1994).
175 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, arts. VI, VIII.
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nent;176 jurisdiction and control remain with the state of regis-
try.177 Prior exercise of jurisdiction and control is an implied
prerequisite in the wording of the text in order for the state to
“retain” such jurisdiction and control.178 “There is no suggestion
that a state or other entity can divest itself of obligations in rela-
tion to space objects by their abandonment.”179 In short, authors
Lyall and Larsen believe that a state “cannot cease to be ‘respon-
sible for’ or avoid any correlative duties by abandoning a space
object.”180 Several prominent jurists have stated that they believe
abandonment of a space object to be both impossible and pro-
hibited by law.181
Cheng, however, holds the view that states are not precluded
from abandoning their space objects.182 With regard to the pos-
sible dereliction of space objects, Clarence Jenks believes that:
[N]either the launching of a space object nor its return to Earth
within the jurisdiction of another State makes it a derelict on the
ground that the launcher has lost ownership by losing control.
The principle does not appear to imply that a space object can
never become a derelict and thereby subject to appropriation by
a third party. One can conceive of circumstances in which the
only reasonable course would be to regard the space object as
having become derelict, for instance if the launcher has dis-
176 N. Jasentuliyana, Regulation of Space Salvage Operations: Possibilities for the Fu-
ture, 22 J. SPACE L. 5, 13 (1994).
177 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Sci. and Tech.
Subcomm. on Its Forty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1001, at 31 (2012);
LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, supra note 50, at 69; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 94, at 83; ODUNTAN, supra note 52, at 180; see also VAN BOGAERT, supra note
40, at 135; Stephan Hobe, The Legal Framework for a Lunar Base Lex Data and Lex
Ferenda, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS: ESSAYS PUBLISHED
FOR THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 138 (Gabriel Laffer-
randerie & Daphne´ Crowther eds., 1997); Ram Jakhu et al., Space Policy, Law and
Security, in THE FARTHEST SHORE: A 21ST CENTURY GUIDE TO SPACE 202, 213 (Jo-
seph N. Pelton & Angelia Bukley eds., 2010); Diederiks-Verschoor, supra note 97,
at 42; Tucker, supra note 142, at 601.
178 Gorove, Criminal Jurisdiction, supra note 172, at 318.
179 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 94, at 84.
180 Id.
181 See HOWARD A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 69–71
(1989); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 94, at 67, 84; Ram S. Jakhu, Iridium-Cosmos
Collision and Its Implications for Space Operations, in YEARBOOK ON SPACE POLICY
2008/2009: SETTING NEW TRENDS 254, 259 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2010);
Jasentuliyana, supra note 176, at 18.
182 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 466; see also Wayne N. White, Real Property
Rights in Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
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claimed any interest in it, or has made no attempt to recover it
over a long period of time.183
Even if a space object itself can be abandoned, effectively aban-
doning jurisdiction and control, “the responsibility for space ob-
jects rest[s] with the launching State and could not be
abandoned.”184
In sum, though it may be possible for a state of registry to
abandon jurisdiction and control of its space object, responsibil-
ity and liability will remain with the launching state. With regard
to space heritage, however, it seems unlikely that a state would
actually disclaim an object that it believed to be a part of its
national heritage or the heritage of mankind. If such abandon-
ment were to be possible, however, it may leave open the option
for another state to take on protection of such disclaimed heri-
tage. It should be noted, however, that “[t]he suggestion that
neglect of cultural objects weakens a nation’s claim to exclusive
sovereignty over them does not arise in international cultural
property discussions”185 and would, in fact, be controversial in
light of prior takings of terrestrial cultural heritage.
5. Return of Space Objects
The return of space objects is an important aspect of space
law with regard to cultural heritage. It is this area of law that will
provide for the repatriation of space heritage objects that may
be removed from their resting places in outer space or on celes-
tial bodies. The final sentence of Article VIII of the Outer Space
Treaty, which governs this issue, is as follows: “Such objects or
component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to
the Treaty on whose registry they are carried shall be returned
to that State Party, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying
data prior to their return.”186 It is this clause upon which Article
V of the Return and Rescue Agreement is based, which reads:
1. Each Contracting Party which receives information or discov-
ers that a space object or its component parts has returned to
Earth in territory under its jurisdiction or on the high seas or
in any other place not under the jurisdiction of any State,
183 JENKS, SPACE LAW, supra note 99, at 240.
184 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Sub-
comm. on Its Fifty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1003, at 10 (2012).
185 Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, supra note 67, at 362.
186 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VIII.
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shall notify the launching authority and the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations.
2. Each Contracting Party having jurisdiction over the territory
on which a space object or its component parts has been dis-
covered shall, upon the request of the launching authority
and with assistance from that authority if requested, take
such steps as it finds practicable to recover the object or com-
ponent parts.
3. Upon request of the launching authority, objects launched
into outer space or their component parts found beyond the
territorial limits of the launching authority shall be returned
to or held at the disposal of representatives of the launching
authority, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data
prior to their return.
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, a Con-
tracting Party which has reason to believe that a space object
or its component parts discovered in territory under its juris-
diction, or recovered by it elsewhere, is of a hazardous or
deleterious nature may so notify the launching authority,
which shall immediately take effective steps, under the direc-
tion and control of the said Contracting Party, to eliminate
possible danger of harm.
5. Expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and re-
turn a space object or its component parts under paragraphs
2 and 3 of this Article shall be borne by the launching
authority.187
Thus, the rights and obligations created are as follows: the find-
ing state must notify the launching authority, take such steps as
practicable to recover the object, return the object or hold it at
the disposal of launching authority representatives, and it may
notify the launching authority if they believe the object to be
hazardous; the launching authority may request the recovery
and return of its space object, must take effective steps to miti-
gate danger caused by its space object, and must pay for the
expenses incurred in the recovery and return of the space
object.
It is interesting to note that while the Outer Space Treaty con-
fers rights upon the state of registry, the Return and Rescue
Agreement confers rights on the launching authority. The Re-
turn and Rescue Agreement defines the “launching authority”
as “the State responsible for launching.”188 The Registration
Convention defines the “State of registry” as “a launching State
187 Return and Rescue Agreement, supra note 28, art. 5.
188 Id. art. 6.
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on whose registry a space object is carried.”189 Therefore, in ei-
ther case it will be a launching state that retains the granted
rights. The “launching State” is defined by both the Registration
Convention and Liability Convention as: “(i) A State which
launches or procures the launching of a space object; (ii) A
State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched.”190 This definition “was broadly conceived to cover
every State which has a predominant role in the launching.”191
Thus, the only circumstance under which the difference in ter-
minology may be problematic is when there is more than one
launching state, in which case the holder of such rights should
be determined by the agreement of the launching states, or in
the event of a change of the state of registration to a non-
launching state (though the discussion of whether or not this is
possible in international law is beyond the scope of this Article).
The Moon Agreement specifically applies Article 5 of the Re-
turn and Rescue Agreement to circumstances under which the
Moon Agreement operates.192 Therefore, there is a degree of
protection offered for space heritage objects under either Arti-
cle VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, under Article 5 of the Return
and Rescue Agreement, or under the Moon Agreement. In a
case where all relevant states are parties to both the Outer Space
Treaty and one of either the Return and Rescue Agreement or
the Moon Agreement, the provisions of the Return and Rescue
Agreement will control, and the provisions of the Outer Space
Treaty will only apply to the extent that they do not conflict with
the relevant provisions in the Return and Rescue Agreement.193
Fundamentally, both of the relevant provisions would provide
for the return of a space object to the registering state if a space
object were removed from its resting place in outer space or on
a celestial body. Thus, if a party without the authority to perform
such retrieval removed space heritage objects, the state in which
such object came to reside would be obligated to return it to the
state of registry.
Under the Outer Space Treaty, this obligation would be abso-
lute, in that the words “shall be returned” are used.194 Under the
Return and Rescue Agreement, this obligation seems weaker, re-
189 Registration Convention, supra note 31, art. I(c).
190 Id. art. I(a); Liability Convention, supra note 29, art. I(c).
191 VAN BOGAERT, supra note 40, at 118.
192 Moon Agreement, supra note 33, art. 12(2).
193 See Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 30.
194 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VIII.
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quiring only that when requested, the state “take such steps as it
finds practicable to recover the object.”195 Cheng, however, ar-
gues that the obligation to return space objects under the Re-
turn and Rescue Agreement is also absolute and is
unconditional when requested by the launching authority.196 It
also requires that the state of registry “[pay] for the expenses
incurred in recovering and returning space objects, if it has re-
quested the recovery and return of such objects.”197 Presumably
if return was requested following a recovery that was not re-
quested, such recovery would not be included in the mandatory
payment, but this issue may arise in the future if recovery of
space objects from space becomes more commonplace.
6. Liability
The rules with regard to liability for damage to space objects
are important to the preservation of space heritage; these rules
will determine when states are liable for damage to such heri-
tage. The Liability Convention is an elaboration of Article VII of
the Outer Space Treaty,198 which has, in conjunction with the
state responsibility requirements of Article VI, arguably become
part of customary international law.199 Article VII states:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory
or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for dam-
age to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridi-
cal persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth,
in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies.200
Liability arises under the Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty in
the sense that such liability is imposed as a secondary obligation
flowing from the attribution of space activities to the state.201
Importantly, Article VI states, in relevant part, that:
195 Return and Rescue Agreement, supra note 28, art. 5(2).
196 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 283.
197 Id. at 281.
198 Id. at 636; Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer
Space 32 J. SPACE L. 31, 52 (2006).
199 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 94, at 71.
200 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VII.
201 See Ricky J. Lee, The Liability Convention and Private Space Launch Services, 31
ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 351, 359 (2006).
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States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of
non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and con-
tinuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty.202
This provision subjects states to responsibility for the activities of
their nationals in outer space, including the authorization and
supervision of such activities. With regard to the Liability
Convention,
An assessment of the terms of Articles 3 and 7 of the 1967 treaty
makes it clear that international law is generally relevant to the
liability of states for launching space objects and for the space
activities resulting from those launches. Because international
law is applicable to such conduct, it is important to identify some
international principles concerning space activity that do not de-
rive from formal treaties.203
States are responsible for their internationally wrongful
acts.204 “[A]ny violation by a State of any obligation, of whatever
origin, gives rise to State responsibility . . . .”205 A breach of
treaty obligations is a breach of a state’s obligations. In accor-
dance with the holding of the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Chorzo´w Factory case, there are three elements of
liability in international law: a legal obligation owed by a state;
an act by a state which breaches that obligation; and an appar-
ent link between the wrongful act and the damage caused.206 A
“failure to subject non-governmental national space activities to
authorization and continuing supervision would constitute an
independent and separate cause of responsibility” under Article
VI of the Outer Space Treaty.207 A due diligence standard would
202 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. VI.
203 CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 212 (1991).
204 Corfu Channel (U.K./Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 23, 36 (Apr.
9).
205 Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 251 (1990).
206 Factory at Chorzo´w (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at
29–30 (Sept. 13).
207 Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsi-
bility”, “National Activities”, and “The Appropriate State,” 26 J. SPACE L. 7, 13–14
(1998).
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apply to breaches of treaty obligations.208 If that standard is met,
“State responsibility occurs the moment the breach is commit-
ted, and not when the State is seen to have failed in its duty to
prevent, suppress or repress such a breach.”209
The Corfu Channel case also established a standard for liability
in international law, that the breaching party “knew or should
have known” of the wrongful act.210 This is the general fault
standard in customary international law and is also presumably
the standard that would be applied for fault-based liability under
Article III of the Liability Convention, which states:
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the sur-
face of the earth to a space object of one launching State or to
persons or property on board such a space object by a space ob-
ject of another launching State, the latter shall be liable only if
the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it
is responsible.211
This is the relevant provision of the Liability Convention with
regard to space heritage located in outer space, as it is the provi-
sion that governs liability for damage caused to one space object
by another space object. The Corfu Channel fault-based liability
standard can be applied here in accordance with the primary
treaty interpretation rules provided by the Vienna Convention,
which permits the use of “[a]ny relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between the parties.”212
If damage is caused to a state’s space heritage under this stan-
dard, liability may arise under international law. Given that the
dangers to these heritage objects are well established,213 any
damage caused by interaction with or proximity to such a site
would likely satisfy the “knew or should have known” standard.
In addition to claims under international law, the Liability Con-
vention does not foreclose the possibility of pursuing liability
claims in domestic courts under domestic tort law standards.214
In fact, the Liability Convention specifically permits the pursuit
208 Id. at 15.
209 Id.
210 Corfu Channel (U.K./Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 18 (Apr. 9).
211 Liability Convention, supra note 29, art. III.
212 Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 31.2(c).
213 See NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING ENTITIES, supra note 8, at
13.
214 See Michael C. Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and Risk Management
in the Event of a Commercial Human Space Flight Vehicle Accident, 74 J. AIR L. & COM.
371, 389 (2009).
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of claims in a launching state’s courts,215 though domestic law in
a given state may preclude claims for damages in space.216
Responsibility and breaches of obligation do not necessarily in-
volve the payment of compensation, especially when no damage
has been caused. . . . The term liability is often used specifically
to denote the obligation to bear the consequences of a breach of
legal duty, in particular the obligation to make reparation for any
damage caused . . . .217
The question regarding what sorts of damages are compensable
under the Liability Convention has been widely discussed. The
Convention defines damage as: “loss of life, personal injury or
other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of
States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of interna-
tional intergovernmental organizations.”218 According to Eilene
Galloway, this defines the full scope of damages available under
the Liability Convention.219 The definition provided does not
draw a distinction between direct, indirect, or consequential
damage. Carl Christol stated that the Liability Convention can
apply to both direct and indirect damage,220 while Cheng be-
lieves that the question of direct versus indirect damage is a
question of “adequate causality” that did not need to be specifi-
cally addressed in the treaty language.221 In fact, the drafters of
the Liability Convention rejected draft language in which indi-
rect damages would be articulated within the definition of dam-
ages.222 Thus, indirect damages would certainly not be
automatically included under the Liability Convention, and a
case-by-case analysis would need to be performed. Indirect dam-
ages may also be otherwise recoverable under general interna-
tional law.
215 Liability Convention, supra note 29, art. XI(2).
216 Cf. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects Under
International and National Law, 37 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 333, 347 (2012).
217 Cheng, Article VI, supra note 207, at 9–10.
218 Liability Convention, supra note 29, art. I(a).
219 Eilene Galloway, Which Method of Realization in Public International Law Can
Be Considered Most Desirable and Having the Greatest Chances of Realization?, in SET-
TLEMENT OF SPACE LAW DISPUTES: THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW AND PERSPEC-
TIVES FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 163 (Karl-Heinz Bo¨ckstiegel ed., 1979).
220 CHRISTOL, supra note 203, at 223.
221 Bin Cheng, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra note 103, at 83, 115.
222 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm.
on Its Third Session, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/21, Annex II, IV (1964).
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Under public international law, damages can be awarded pro-
vided that they are proximately caused by the wrongful act and
can be reasonably estimated.223 Economic damages that are too
uncertain or remote from a wrongful act, however, are not re-
coverable.224 A case-by-case examination of proximate causation
would have to be made under the Liability Convention or public
international law to determine whether these damages would be
recoverable.
Though reparations that “wipe out all the consequences of
the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed”225
are the standard measure of damages in international law, it is
not always possible to make full restitution using reparations. In
the case of the destruction of irreplaceable space heritage, resti-
tution would be impossible. In such a case, where the “well-es-
tablished rule of international law that an injured State is
entitled to obtain compensation from the State which has com-
mitted an internationally wrongful act”226 fails to address the ac-
tual loss incurred, the state would have an entitlement to
satisfaction such as a formal apology.227
In sum, the basic legal responsibility for a space object lies
with the launching authority.228 Thus, the launching state of any
space object causing damage to space heritage would be held
liable for such damage. Though damages are recoverable, how-
ever, they would not actually restore the heritage. Thus, liability
acts as more of a protective deterrent than as an effective rem-
edy for damage to space heritage, though compensation would
be provided.
223 See Clyde Eagleton, Measure of Damages in International Law, 39 YALE L.J. 52,
73–75 (1929).
224 See, e.g., Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907, 1931 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1941); JAMES CRAWFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 230–31 (James Crawford ed., 2002).
225 Factory at Chorzo´w (Ger v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at
47 (Sept. 13).
226 Gabcı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep.
7, ¶ 152 (Sept. 25).
227 See G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, art. 37, Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 56/83, Arti-
cles on Responsibility]; see also CRAWFORD, supra note 224, at 231.
228 CHRISTOL, supra note 203, at 260.
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7. Environmental Protection
Given the close connection between terrestrial cultural and
natural heritage law and environmental law, it is useful to con-
sider if the environmental provisions of space law can be seen to
provide any benefit to space heritage. As Armel Kerrest aptly
points out, environmental damage is not considered in the Lia-
bility Convention, barring states from seeking compensation for
such damage.229 The Moon’s lack of a mechanism for environ-
mental renewal, however, does make it highly susceptible to en-
vironmental damage and change.230 Such damage or change is
likely to negatively impact space heritage resting on the surface
of the Moon. Under international law, it is an established rule
that states are obliged not to cause harm beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.231 It is argued that this obligation has crys-
tallized into a rule of customary international law.232
Unlike the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty, the drafters of
the Moon Agreement had the benefit of knowledge and an un-
derstanding of the fragility of the Moon’s environment resulting
from human excursions to the Moon.233 Professor Hobe notes
that even though clauses regarding lunar environmental protec-
tion are present in Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty and
Article 7 of the Moon Agreement, they are not as thoroughly
articulated as necessary to achieve the objective of lunar envi-
ronmental protection.234 The second sentence of Article IX con-
tains the environmental provision. It is reproduced as follows:
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct ex-
ploration of them so as to avoid their harmful contamination and
229 See Armel Kerrest, Outer Space as International Space: Lessons from Antarctica, in
SCIENCE DIPLOMACY: ANTARCTICA, SCIENCE, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL SPACES 133, 135 (Paul Arthur Berkman et al. eds., 2011).
230 See Mark Williamson, Space Ethics and Protection of the Space Environment, 19
SPACE POL’Y 47, 47 (2003).
231 See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1907, 1963, 1965 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1941); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I)
(Aug. 12, 1992); U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declara-
tion on the Human Environment, princs. 21–22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1
(June 16, 1972).
232 See, e.g., P.W. BIRNIE & A.E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 89 (2d ed. 2002); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 94, at 71.
233 See Paul B. Larsen, Application of the Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J.
AIR L. & COM. 295, 300 (2006).
234 Hobe, supra note 177, at 141.
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also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where nec-
essary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.235
Unfortunately, this provision only protects celestial bodies from
harmful contamination, so unless its principle is interpreted to
possess a broader meaning, either under the treaty provision it-
self or as customary international law, it will not provide benefit
for our purposes.
While paragraph 1 of the Moon Agreement’s Article 7 man-
dates “measures to prevent the disruption of the existing bal-
ance of [the Moon’s] environment,”236 paragraph 3 is the more
useful provision for the purposes of this Article. It states:
States Parties shall report to other States Parties and to the Secre-
tary-General concerning areas of the moon having special scien-
tific interest in order that, without prejudice to the rights of
other States Parties, consideration may be given to the designa-
tion of such areas as international scientific preserves for which
special protective arrangements are to be agreed upon in consul-
tation with the competent bodies of the United Nations.237
While this provision only provides protection for sites of scien-
tific interest, for the time being, this provision does apply to his-
toric sites, as one of the rationales for their preservation is the
study of the effects of long-term exposure to the space and lunar
environments.238 Unfortunately, this provision does not set forth
procedures for designation.239
Francis Lyall argues that the environmental provisions of the
Moon Agreement “may be taken to express the international
will on such matters” due to the discussions that led to the
Agreement regarding these provisions and the fact that the
Agreement was adopted in the U.N. General Assembly without a
vote.240 Likewise, it is worth noting that the International Court
of Justice in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case held that subse-
quently obtained scientific knowledge can be utilized in the in-
235 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX.
236 Moon Agreement, supra note 33, art. 7(1).
237 Id. art. 7(3).
238 NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING ENTITIES, supra note 8, at
19–20.
239 Lyall, OST Art. IX, supra note 90, at 664.
240 Francis Lyall, Planetary Protection from a Legal Perspective – General Issues, in
PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT OF CELESTIAL BODIES, supra note 79, at 55, 57.
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terpretation of the scope of treaties drafted before the
acquisition of such knowledge.241
8. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty
Finally, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty is a keystone pro-
vision for the protection of space heritage. Cheng points to the
irony that “in the first of the three provisions in which the
strongest binding element is to be found, Article IX of the
Treaty speaks of the contracting States being ‘guided by the
principle of co-operation and mutual assistance’, rather than of
their being ‘bound’ by it.”242
Article IX first provides:
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be
guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual assistance
and shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corre-
sponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty.243
“This rule is directly applicable to the exercise of State jurisdic-
tion in outer space. Thus, States may not pass laws which would
contravene the general principle of co-operation and mutual as-
sistance,”244 or they will incur international responsibility for
such actions. Contained in this provision is an implied call for
reciprocity in the conduct of space activities.
The final part of Article IX provides the rules that are most
essential to the discussion of space heritage. It reads as follows:
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity
or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space, in-
cluding the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause poten-
tially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate
international consultations before proceeding with any such ac-
tivity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason
to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another
State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, would cause potentially harmful interference with ac-
tivities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,
241 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045,
1060 (Dec. 13).
242 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 402.
243 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX.
244 CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 123.
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including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request con-
sultation concerning the activity or experiment.245
If a state were to declare its consideration of certain space ob-
jects as space heritage that would be damaged by direct interac-
tion or close approach, it would provide other state parties with
unquestionable reason to believe that such an activity “would
cause potentially harmful interference” with such protection.246
The state, therefore, would be bound to undertake consulta-
tions before proceeding with its activity. Though only the con-
sultations are mandatory, and thus the activity itself is not halted
by this rule, it provides an important pause in the process to
consider potential damage not only to space heritage but also to
relations between states. The reciprocity that is built into the
first provision of Article IX therefore provides an incentive for
states to act in conformity with the wishes of their peers in terms
of potential harmful interference. The final provision merely
permits a state, believing its activities may be harmed, to request
consultations. This provision is weaker than the first but still pro-
vides a benefit both in terms of good faith and reciprocity.
III. CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW
A. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW
The first individual noted in recorded history who called for
the protection of national cultural heritage in the form of art
was a Greek historian named Polybius.247 The principle that
“cultural property is inviolable, and cannot be misappropriated
by a conquering state” was first codified in the United States’
Lieber Code in 1863.248 The first modern instrument created for
the protection of cultural heritage, and the starting point for
our discussion with regard to space heritage, was the Hague
Convention of 1954.249 In the context of instruments of modern
cultural heritage law beginning with the Hague Convention of
1954, the relative age of the heritage law with which this Article
245 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX.
246 See id.
247 See John Moustakas, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict Inaliena-
bility, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1989).
248 SHARON A. WILLIAMS, THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROTECTION OF
MOVEABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 15–16 (1978); see also
FRANCIS LIEBER, GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD (Apr. 24, 1863).
249 See CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
HERITAGE 24 (2010).
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is concerned is similar to that of outer space law. Given their
chronological proximity, these two forms of law lend themselves
well to comparison and complementary use.
A recognition that these heritage sites would need coordi-
nated protection spurred the creation of a cooperative regime.
“The impetus for the development of an international protec-
tive regime was not only the recognition that many properties in
individual States had significance for humankind as a whole, but
also that a permanent system of co-operation was required to
assist States in their role as guardians of this heritage.”250 This
rationale is similar to the rationale for the early development of
the space law regime, which was established to promote cooper-
ation, preserve the valuable resource that is outer space for all
mankind, and avoid conflict with regard to this new arena.251
There are two competing philosophies with regard to cultural
heritage: the national heritage school and the common heritage
of mankind school.252 While certain states certainly could main-
tain the policy that their heritage objects and sites in outer space
are national treasures that form a part of their national identity
(the United States with regard to Tranquility Base or Russia with
regard to the Lunakhod rovers, for example), the common heri-
tage of mankind view of cultural heritage is better suited to the
existing space law regime, given that space has been classified as
“the province of all mankind.”253 This view of cultural heritage,
which dovetails with the legal view of outer space, holds that
“[t]he history and development of our species is one history,
and the culture of the world is greater than the sum of individ-
ual cultures.”254 The heritage of this common human culture
exists regardless of national jurisdiction, property rights, or pre-
sent location.255
In a cultural heritage context, the province of mankind con-
cept is “concerned with keeping and preserving cultural prop-
erty in their present locations or ensuring export by legal
means” rather than ensuring that access or any specific benefit
250 Id. at 227.
251 See G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, pmbl., ¶ 6 (Dec.
13, 1963).
252 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM.
J. INT’L L. 831, 831–32 (1986).
253 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art I.
254 FORREST, supra note 249, at 11.
255 Id. at 13.
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from the heritage can be shared with all mankind.256 This idea is
similar to the benefit of mankind concept from the U.N. Decla-
ration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (which was enshrined
in the Outer Space Treaty),257 though the application of the
concept with regard to the environment forms a closer parallel
to cultural heritage law.258
In general, it is possible to draw a parallel between cultural
heritage law and environmental law.259 This makes sense in the
context that cultural heritage is a nonrenewable resource.260
Though humanity will continue to produce new heritage, any
objects or sites that are lost cannot be recovered. Thus, cultural
heritage should be treated legally the same way that an environ-
mentally endangered species may be treated.261 Therefore, envi-
ronmental provisions with regard to outer space are relevant to
cultural protection.262
Considering the status of cultural heritage in outer space
before significant danger presents itself to such heritage is im-
perative to protecting the perception that it is indeed the heri-
tage of all mankind.
Claims that a particular work of art or building or archaeological
site belongs to some particular heritage are usually made when
there is a perception of danger, either because something is go-
ing to happen (such as destruction, or looting or sale overseas)
or conversely something is failing to happen (such as conserva-
tion or upkeep). Calling on the ‘heritage of all mankind’ is cer-
tainly useful if we want to stop destruction, looting, decay or
benign neglect, and where we want to signal to the agents of such
change that they should think about values other than their own.
But although claims to preserve important cultural things on be-
half of all mankind may be noble and worthy of our support in
principle, they frequently conflict with two other potentially com-
peting social facts: that many things are claimed by particular cul-
tures, and that many things are privately owned. The quick
256 WILLIAMS, supra note 248, at 55.
257 Id. at 57–58 (first citing G.A. Res. 1962, supra note 251; then citing Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I).
258 See id. at 60–63.
259 DEREK GILLMAN, THE IDEA OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 48 (Cambridge Univ.
Press rev. ed. 2010).
260 Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, supra note 59, at 69.
261 See GILLMAN, supra note 259, at 48.
262 See supra section II.C.7.
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answer would be that all things are equally part of ‘world heri-
tage’ and a particular national or local heritage.263
The principle that space heritage is both the heritage of man-
kind and the heritage of the launching state may help to pro-
mote its protection before it is too late while simultaneously
avoiding contentious value judgments regarding the status of
the heritage and protecting individual state interests.
A cultural heritage of mankind status makes it “incumbent on
the holding State to ensure that the interests of humankind are
taken into consideration when decisions are made concerning
items of cultural heritage, such as terms of access, dissemination
of information as well as physical protection.”264 It is desirable
not only that cultural heritage in space be protected but also
that it be protected with these factors in mind. “The emerging
regime of cultural heritage law performs five inter-related func-
tions: protection, co-operation, rectification, criminal justice and dis-
pute resolution.”265 In general, from an object-oriented approach,
the appropriate handling of cultural heritage should be deter-
mined on the basis of three factors: (1) whether the movement
or acquisition of the object is likely to cause danger to the object
or the context in which the object was found; (2) whether such
movement or acquisition is likely to more fully reveal the truth
of the object; and (3) the relative availability of the object for
research, education, and enjoyment as a result of such move-
ment or acquisition.266
Given the issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction present in the
space law regime,267 questions regarding cultural heritage sites
are particularly relevant to this discussion.
Experts often argue that the original configuration of an historic
building or site has integrity similar to that of a work of art. Yet
our ideas about what constitutes a complete architectural com-
plex (or a complete painting, poem or symphony) have devel-
oped over centuries, and across classes, regions and cultures.268
These ideas are in part but not wholly applicable to sites like
Tranquility Base. It will be necessary to consider the unique fea-
263 GILLMAN, supra note 259, at 15.
264 FORREST, supra note 249, at 13.
265 James A.R. Nafziger, Cultural Heritage Law: The International Regime, in THE
CULTURAL HERITAGE OF MANKIND 145, 161 (James A.R. Nafziger & Tullio Scovazzi
eds., 2008).
266 Merryman, The Nation and the Object, supra note 174, at 64–65.
267 See supra section II.C.
268 GILLMAN, supra note 259, at 166.
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tures of such sites and consider the lack of gravity and atmos-
phere when determining the scope of protection for these sites,
which may require a larger area of protection to prevent blow-
back from landings or damage from faulty trajectories.269
The debates in the cultural heritage law arena regarding
whether or not the country of origin should have a right to re-
turn of possession of their cultural heritage270 are null in the
space law arena—the Return and Rescue Agreement, in combi-
nation with Article V of the Outer Space Treaty, render this
question moot.271 A state is inherently entitled to the return of
its space objects; thus, ownership at least should not present a
complex problem.
In determining the scope of the areas to be protected in
space, we must determine what constitutes the embodiment of
these values for the purposes of cultural heritage in space.
Cultural heritage is value in the sense that it is neither the object
nor the practice itself which is of some importance to a people,
but the importance itself. It is embodied in an object, a land-
scape, a dance or all three in combination. And it is this which
legal regimes aim to protect.272
Generally speaking, important values from a heritage perspec-
tive include expressive, archaeological, historic, and economic
values, though “symbolic, informational, aesthetic, economic,
historic, scientific, cultural, archaeological, ethnic, public, recre-
ational, educational, technical, social or legal value[s]” are often
also factors.273 In the realm of cultural heritage in space, the
most important factors may be historic, symbolic, informational,
scientific, and technical. The critical issue at hand is the physical
preservation of such cultural objects themselves, and, in con-
junction, the preservation of their context to the greatest extent
feasible.274
B. TREATY LAW
The key body associated with the development of the protec-
tion of cultural heritage law is UNESCO, which has been re-
269 See infra section IV.A.
270 See Karen J. Warren, A Philosophical Perspective on the Ethics and Resolution of
Cultural Property Issues, in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY: WHOSE
CULTURE? WHOSE PROPERTY? 1, 1 (Phyllis Mauch Messenger ed., 1990).
271 See supra section II.C.5.
272 FORREST, supra note 249, at 3–4.
273 Id. at 4.
274 See Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural Property, supra note 67, at 355.
344 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
sponsible for the bulk of cultural heritage law since World War
II.275 “Bilateral and multilateral agreements represent the most
formal legal bases for co-operation in avoiding and resolving dis-
putes over the status of cultural material.”276 This subsection will
review the key multilateral agreements that have emerged from
UNESCO as well as one convention from the International Insti-
tute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT).
1. The Hague Convention of 1954
There are two categories of international cultural heritage
protections: those in effect with regard to times of armed con-
flict and those in effect with regard to peacetime.277 The Hague
Convention of 1954 is primarily an instrument designed with re-
gard to armed conflict.278 This Convention enshrines the con-
cept that cultural heritage is the province of all mankind.279 In
addition to putting forth this idea, the preamble states, “protec-
tion cannot be effective unless both national and international
measures have been taken to organize it in time of peace.”280
Interestingly, Article 1(a) characterizes cultural property as
property of “great importance to the cultural heritage of every
people” rather than the cultural heritage of a people, a nation,
or a state.281 Article 1, which defines cultural property, provides
the guidelines of what may be considered cultural property
under the Hague Convention of 1954.282 Examples of such
“movable or immovable property of great importance to the cul-
tural heritage of every people” that may pertain to space heri-
tage include objects of historical interest and scientific
collections.283
The list provided in Article 1(a) is inclusive rather than exclu-
sive, so an object need not fall specifically into one of these cate-
gories; it must simply meet the “great importance” test.284 Article
1(b) pertains specifically to buildings intended to “preserve or
exhibit” cultural property, and thus is not relevant to this discus-
275 PATRICK J. O’KEEFE & LYNDEL V. PROTT, CULTURAL HERITAGE CONVENTIONS
AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM WITH COMMENTARIES 1 (2011).
276 Nafziger, supra note 265, at 198.
277 Hague Convention of 1954, supra note 22, res. II, art. 8.
278 See id. at pmbl.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id. art. 1(a).
282 Id. art. 1.
283 See id. art. 1(a).
284 See id.
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sion of cultural property situated in outer space,285 as by defini-
tion, if an item of space heritage has been placed into such a
structure, it has become terrestrial heritage, even if it is funda-
mentally related to our shared history of space exploration. The
definition of cultural property itself does not mention the terri-
tory or location of an object and specifies that origin or owner-
ship are irrelevant.286
Articles 2 and 3 deal with protection and safeguarding of cul-
tural property respectively,287 with Article 3 being the more op-
erative provision calling upon the “High Contracting Parties” to
undertake a specific activity, in this case, preparing for the safe-
guarding of cultural property in a “time of peace . . . against the
foreseeable effects of an armed conflict . . . .”288 Unfortunately,
this provision specifically applies only to cultural property situ-
ated within the territory of a state, and thus would not apply to
cultural property in outer space or on a celestial body.289 Like-
wise, Article 4(1), which provides for respect for cultural prop-
erty, applies only to cultural property located in a state’s
territory.290
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 4, however, are not specifically
tied to the territorial location of a piece of cultural property.291
Paragraph 3 concerns the prohibition, prevention, and halting
of theft, pillage, misappropriation and vandalism of cultural
property.292 Thus, a state that is a High Contracting Party to the
Convention would be bound to avoid taking these actions or
permitting their nationals to undertake these actions, even
against cultural property that may be located in space or on a
celestial body. Paragraph 4 states that states “shall refrain from
any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property.”293
This would therefore indicate that if a state were engaged in a
conflict with another state that is also a party to the Convention,
it would be impermissible for such state to direct reprisals
against cultural heritage, including any cultural heritage that
may be located in outer space.
285 See id. art. 1(b).
286 Id. art. 1.
287 Id. arts. 2–3.
288 Id. art. 3.
289 See id.
290 Id. art. 4(1).
291 See id. art. 4(3)–(4).
292 See id. art. 4(3).
293 Id. art. 4(4).
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Article 5 discusses occupation of the territory of another High
Contracting Party,294 and thus is inapplicable to a space context
given Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty. Article 6 permits but
does not require the marking of cultural property with a “dis-
tinctive emblem,”295 as described in Article 16 (a shield with two
white triangles, a blue triangle, and a blue square forming a
pentagon).296 Such marking could be used on space heritage if
desired by a state. Article 7 deals with fostering and securing
military respect for cultural heritage and introducing military
regulations to ensure compliance with the Hague Convention of
1954 in case of a conflict.297 Given that this provision is worded
regarding cultural heritage generally, it would include space
heritage, however, in this context, the most it would provide in
the way of protection is education within the military that such
objects could be considered cultural property to be so
protected.
Chapter II of the Hague Convention of 1954 deals with heri-
tage under special protection on the “International Register of
Cultural Property under Special Protection.”298 Items can only
be included on this list if they are contained in a refuge or a
center containing monuments or if they are immovable cultural
property.299 It is not foreseeable in the near future that space
heritage objects would be moved into refuges or centers located
in outer space and thus would not be able to be labeled under
special protection for this purpose. Though the Hauge Conven-
tion does not define “immovable,” the objects located in outer
space are inherently movable in the sense that they were moved
from Earth to outer space. Footprints and rover tracks are not
“property” and thus would also not fall within the protections of
this particular regime.
Chapter III of the Hague Convention deals with the transpor-
tation of cultural property.300 Article 12, however, defines trans-
portation as “within a territory or to another territory,” and thus
excludes transportation exclusively in outer space or to a terri-
tory from outer space.301 Chapter IV, which consists only of Arti-
294 See id. art. 5.
295 Id. art. 6.
296 See id. art. 16.
297 Id. art. 7.
298 Id. art. 8(6).
299 See id. art. 8(1)–(3), (6) & n.1.
300 Id. arts. 12–14.
301 See id. art. 12(1).
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cle 15, concerns personnel who are “engaged in the protection
of cultural property,” requiring that they be respected and al-
lowed to continue their duties if captured by the opposing party
in a conflict.302 As there is no territorial designation here, this
provision would apply to personnel engaged in the protection of
space heritage. Chapter V sets forth the emblem that may be
used for marking cultural property, including space heritage as
mentioned above with regard to Article 6, and the procedures
for using this emblem.303
Chapter VI deals with the scope of application of the Hague
Convention and specifies that it is operative “in the event of de-
clared war or of any other armed conflict” between contracting
parties, “even if the state of war is not recognized by one or
more of them.”304 Such a conflict need not be “of an interna-
tional character,” but in the event of such a non-international
conflict, it would only relate to conflicts occurring within the
territory of a High Contracting Party305 and thus would poten-
tially exclude instances in which such a conflict may extend to
outer space or take place exclusively in outer space. Only those
provisions that specify that they “take effect in time of peace”
are operative outside of an armed conflict.306 While the defini-
tion and scope of “armed conflict” is certainly relevant here, in
the sense that it would be important to determine if, for exam-
ple, non-kinetic attacks on satellites or other space assets alone
would constitute armed conflict, that question is far too com-
plex to be adequately addressed in the scope of this Article.
Needless to say, such an analysis would be helpful in determin-
ing the applicability of the Hague Convention to space heritage
during a conflict involving outer space.
Article 23 specifies that a High Contracting Party can call
upon UNESCO for “technical assistance in organizing the pro-
tection of their cultural property” or with any other issue that
arises out of the application of the Hague Convention of
1954.307 As this provision only uses the term “their” and does not
specify the location of “their” cultural property,308 it is reasona-
ble to assume that a request for assistance in protecting cultural
302 Id. art. 15.
303 Id. arts. 16–17.
304 Id. art. 18(1).
305 Id. art. 19(1).
306 See id. art. 18(1).
307 Id. art. 23(1).
308 See id.
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property which is located in outer space would be permissible
under Article 23, particularly given that the technical aspects of
protection of heritage in outer space would be especially daunt-
ing. Special agreements outside of the Hague Convention are
permitted,309 as are amendments to the Convention in accor-
dance with the procedure set forth in Article 39,310 clearly estab-
lishing the possibility for specific amendments or agreements
dealing with space heritage.
2. Illicit Transfer Convention
The Illicit Transfer Convention is an example of a more na-
tionalistic perspective on cultural heritage. Though it specifies
that “interchange of cultural property” can “increase the knowl-
edge of the civilization of Man,” it is primarily directed at na-
tional culture, explaining that cultural property is “one of the
basic elements” of such.311
For the purposes of this Convention, cultural property must
be specifically designated by a state; in addition, such property
must meet the basic criteria of importance in one of several
listed areas, including history or science, and belong to a speci-
fied set of categories, including “property relating to history, in-
cluding the history of science and technology and military and
social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists
and artists and to events of national importance.”312 This test is
the “definitional test.”313 As Patrick O’Keefe explains, the
travaux pre´paratoires of the Convention do not indicate that the
method of specific designation should be restrictive, rather, that
a state could use any method of designation that it deems appro-
priate, including implementing legislation.314 The travaux
pre´paratoires can be used as a supplementary means of treaty in-
terpretation in accordance with the Vienna Convention.315
It would be difficult to imagine that the property remaining at
Tranquility Base would not be considered important to history
or science or would not fall into the category relating to events
of national importance (in this case, the Moon landing). There-
309 Id. art. 24(1).
310 Id. art. 39(1).
311 See Illicit Transfer Convention, supra note 18, pmbl.
312 Id. art. 1.
313 WILLIAMS, supra note 248, at 180.
314 PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVENTION ON
ILLICIT TRAFFIC 36 (2d ed. 2007).
315 See Vienna Convention, supra note 100, art. 32.
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fore, provided that a state was to designate space heritage as cul-
tural property for the purposes of this convention, such
property could appropriately be considered cultural property.
Article 4 of the Illicit Transfer Convention further clarifies
that cultural property belonging to a specific set of categories,
including “property created by the individual or collective ge-
nius of nationals” or created within the territory of the state by
individuals who are not nationals, will be part of a specific state’s
cultural heritage.316 This is the “connection test.”317 Thus, terri-
tory is only relevant at the time of the creation of an object and
even then is only relevant if non-nationals of the state in ques-
tion created such an object. Thus, objects launched into outer
space can still qualify as the cultural property of a state.
The problem with the Illicit Transfer Convention from the
perspective of space heritage, however, is the fact that it would
only affect activities occurring after such space heritage had al-
ready been disturbed. Article 3 renders the “import, export or
transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to
the provisions” of the Convention to be illicit.318 The remaining
provisions of this Convention help to define what sorts of trad-
ing are illicit, how to verify that certain trades are permitted,
how to prevent illicit trading, and how to deal with illicit trading
after it has taken place.319 With the exception of those provi-
sions dealing with occupation or possession of territory,320 this
Convention would apply to any space heritage that has been re-
moved from its resting place in outer space.
Article 9 sets forth procedures for a state to call upon other
affected states to assist in dealing with a particular set of circum-
stances in which cultural property has been taken during the
“pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials.”321 This
provision is important, not due to any relevance to outer space
but because its implementation demonstrates the willingness of
states to take commitments to cultural heritage seriously. The
United States, which is a major art importing state, was the first
state to respond to a country’s request for import restrictions
under Article 9 of the Convention, demonstrating a willingness
on the part of the United States to actively uphold the provi-
316 Illicit Transfer Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(a).
317 WILLIAMS, supra note 248, at 181.
318 Illicit Transfer Convention, supra note 18, art. 3.
319 See id. arts. 5–17.
320 Id. arts. 11–12.
321 Id. art. 9.
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sions of international cultural heritage law through their actions
taken under its Convention on Cultural Property Implementa-
tion Act.322 As a major holder of space heritage, and as a state
that is actively trying to protect its space heritage, this action
goes a long way toward establishing goodwill in these endeavors.
3. World Heritage Convention
As is apparent from both the title of the World Heritage Con-
vention and the preamble (which references “the world heritage
of mankind as a whole”), this Convention is geared more to-
wards the heritage of mankind concept than the nationalistic
view of heritage.323 The Convention deals with both cultural and
natural heritage, which are defined separately. For the purposes
of cultural heritage, the definition is broken down into three
groups: monuments, groups of buildings, and sites.324 The defi-
nition of sites most closely matches what might include Tran-
quility Base or its ilk as “works of man or the combined works of
nature and of man,” which include sites of “outstanding univer-
sal [historical] value.”325 Tranquility Base includes not only the
works of man, which both enabled and provided record of
man’s first travel to the Moon, but also includes the natural
beauty of the site itself and the natural materials which were
shaped by the interaction between nature and man, such as foot-
prints and rover tracks.
From the perspective of natural heritage, sites and features
that are of universal outstanding scientific value are included,
but these do not require or indeed include man’s added
value.326 Thus, while there may be natural heritage sites or fea-
tures in outer space, particularly on celestial bodies, such heri-
tage is beyond the scope of this Article. Though the definition
of cultural heritage has always included mixed sites, “In 1992,
the revised Guidelines [to the Convention] included for the first
time cultural landscapes that can be ‘mixed’ sites, i.e. sites that
322 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-446,
tit. III, 96 Stat. 2329 (1983) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613
(2012)); see Ann Guthrie Hingston, U.S. Implementation of the UNESCO Cultural
Property Convention, in THE ETHICS OF COLLECTING CULTURAL PROPERTY, supra note
270, at 129, 129.
323 World Heritage Convention, supra note 20, pmbl.
324 Id. art. 1.
325 See id.
326 See id. art. 2.
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are of significance from both cultural and natural
standpoints.”327
The problem with the World Heritage Convention from a
space perspective becomes apparent in Article 3, which states in
its entirety that “[i]t is for each State Party to this Convention to
identify and delineate the different properties situated on its ter-
ritory mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 above.”328 Thus, to qualify
for listing, sites must fall within the categories of cultural or nat-
ural heritage specified, must be of “outstanding universal value,”
and must be located in the territory of a state party.329 The sites
discussed by this Article are, by definition, located in outer space
and thus not on the territory of any state. Therefore, states can-
not designate these sites even if they would otherwise meet the
definitions provided. “Irrespective of all their natural value, sites
located on the Moon or other celestial bodies cannot be in-
scribed on the World Heritage List . . . .”330
Likewise, Article 4 prescribes a primary duty of states to pro-
tect such sites as described in the definitions of cultural and nat-
ural heritage but only those that are “situated on its territory.”331
While not applicable to outer space, it is interesting to note that
this provision can be considered an obligation erga omnes,332 an
obligation owed to the community of state parties as a whole,333
and is thus enforceable by any party to the Convention.334
Article 5 also sets forth duties for states based on the heritage
situated within their territory.335 However, some of these duties
could also benefit those sites not situated in the territory of any
state, such as “develop[ing] scientific and technical studies and
research . . . counteracting the dangers that threaten [the
State’s] cultural or natural heritage” and “foster[ing] the estab-
327 JANET BLAKE, COMMENTARY ON THE 2003 UNESCO CONVENTION ON THE
SAFEGUARDING OF THE INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE 5 (2006) (citing the
UNESCO Operational Guidelines to the World Heritage Convention).
328 See World Heritage Convention, supra note 20, art. 3.
329 O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 275, at 78.
330 Tullio Scovazzi, Articles 8–11: World Heritage Committee and World Heritage List,
in THE 1972 WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 147, 160 (Francesco
Francioni ed., 2008).
331 World Heritage Convention, supra note 20, art. 4.
332 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5); Roger O’Keefe, World Cultural Heri-
tage: Obligations to the International Community as a Whole?, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
189, 190 (2004).
333 See G.A. Res. 56/83, Articles on Responsibility, supra note 227, art. 48(1)(b).
334 See id. art. 48(2).
335 World Heritage Convention, supra note 20, art. 5.
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lishment or development of national or regional centres for
training in the protection, conservation and presentation of the
cultural and natural heritage and to encourage scientific re-
search in this field.”336 The obligation not to intentionally dam-
age cultural or natural heritage also unfortunately only applies
to heritage situated in the territories of other states.337
Article 7 is the first of the articles in this Convention that
could be said to directly benefit non-territorial heritage. The Ar-
ticle establishes that “international protection of the world cul-
tural and natural heritage” generally means “the establishment
of a system of international co-operation and assistance de-
signed to support States Parties to the Convention in their ef-
forts to conserve and identify” such heritage.338 Article 11(1)
requires that states submit an inventory of natural and cultural
heritage in their respective territory, however it also states that
the inventory “shall not be considered exhaustive.”339 While the
intention is to specify that there may be other heritage in the
territory of the state that is not present on the list of eligible
heritage, it also makes clear that heritage not on the list can still
generally qualify for protection.340 Article 12 further elaborates
this principle, providing that “[t]he fact that a property belong-
ing to the cultural or natural heritage has not been included in
either of the two lists mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Arti-
cle 11 shall in no way be construed to mean that it does not have
an outstanding universal value . . . .”341
Article 11(3), which pertains to inclusion of property situated
in a disputed territory, states that inclusion on the list by one
state does not “prejudice the rights of the [other] parties to the
dispute.”342 While this statement has no impact on heritage in
space, it does provide an indication that amendments could be
made to this Convention to encompass heritage in space, lo-
cated on territory claimed by no state, within the spirit of the
Convention. Cooperation between the Intergovernmental Com-
mittee for the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage,
which was created by Section III of the Convention,343 and other
336 Id. art. 5(c), (e).
337 Id. art. 6(3).
338 Id. art. 7.
339 Id. art. 11(1).
340 See id. arts. 11–12.
341 Id. art. 12.
342 Id. art. 11(3).
343 Id. art. 8(1).
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“organizations having objectives similar to those of this Conven-
tion” is provided for in Article 13(7),344 which also gives some
flexibility for the future.
Article 29 requires that states “give information on the legisla-
tive and administrative provisions which they have adopted and
other action which they have taken for the application of this
Convention, together with details of the experience acquired in
this field” to UNESCO.345 Such experience could include details
with regard to cultural heritage in space. Revision of the Con-
vention by UNESCO is further provided for in Article 37.346 This
set of provisions, taken together, provides opportunities for
learning, improving, and revising the heritage regime, which
could include heritage in outer space.
The High Court of Australia, “which is the only official judi-
cial body to interpret the Convention,”347 held that the duty to
protect heritage arises regardless of whether such heritage has
been identified by the state and submitted for inclusion on the
World Heritage List.348 Unfortunately, the interpretation does
not address whether cultural property not situated on the terri-
tory of a state is included, and such interpretation by a national
high court is merely persuasive in international law
regardless.349
4. UNIDROIT Convention of 1995
While the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Ex-
ported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT Convention) is an impor-
tant piece of international cultural heritage law, given its intent
to close loopholes in national private law,350 its impact on space
heritage is not significant. This is true because it deals primarily
with the restitution and return of cultural objects that have been
stolen or removed.351 While objects of importance for history or
science are covered by this Convention, including property re-
lating to the history of science,352 therefore encompassing space
344 Id. art. 13(7).
345 Id. art. 29(1).
346 Id. art. 37.
347 O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 275, at 79.
348 Richardson v Forestry Comm’n (1988) 164 CLR 261 ¶ 20 (Austl.).
349 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
350 O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 275, at 110.
351 See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 22, art. 1.
352 Id. art. 2, annex(b).
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heritage within its scope, it only impacts those space cultural ob-
jects that were used in the pursuit of exploration of outer space
but were never actually launched into space. Those heritage ob-
jects that are actually space objects would find more relevant
and effective protection under the Return and Rescue Agree-
ment. The Return and Rescue Agreement applies to all space
objects and thus would not require an analysis of which such
objects would constitute space heritage.353
C. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
“[T]he work of UNESCO and the international practice devel-
oping in connection with it has made abundantly clear that the
international community has recognized cultural diversity as the
common heritage of humanity.”354 The development of custom-
ary international law in the cultural heritage arena, which would
be binding even upon those states who are not parties to the
relevant conventions, may help to solve some of the difficulties
relating to cultural heritage in outer space.355
[T]he exponential growth of international cultural property law
in the past fifty years bears witness to the emergence of a new
principle according to which parts of cultural heritage of interna-
tional relevance are to be protected as the common heritage of
humanity. This principle is valid both in the event of armed con-
flict and in peacetime.356
The recognition of cultural heritage as the common heritage of
mankind in international law is the first step towards a binding
international law for space heritage.
Two relatively recent documents produced by UNESCO
would seem to indicate the development of customary interna-
tional cultural heritage law. Both emerged in the aftermath of
the atrocities that occurred with respect to Buddhist cultural
heritage in Afghanistan.357 The first, published in 2001, dis-
cusses the adoption of a declaration that “would not be in-
tended to create obligations for States, but would restate the
fundamental principles of the existing legal instruments and re-
353 See Return and Rescue Agreement, supra note 28, pmbl., art. 5. For further
discussion of this topic, see supra section II.C.5.
354 Francioni, supra note 118, at 1228.
355 See supra section II.B.
356 Francioni, supra note 118, at 1213.
357 UNESCO General Conference, Acts Constituting “A Crime Against the Common
Heritage of Humanity,” ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. 31 C/46 (Sept. 12, 2001).
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inforce certain aspects not covered by these instruments . . . .”358
The second, adopted in 2003, is that very declaration.359 One
perambulatory statement of this declaration is as follows: “Mind-
ful of the development of rules of customary international law as
also affirmed by the relevant case-law, related to the protection
of cultural heritage in peacetime as well as in the event of armed
conflict.”360 This “resounding affirmation of an emergent politi-
cal consensus”361 would also indicate a belief from UNESCO
that, in fact, an applicable customary international law of cul-
tural heritage has crystallized. Unfortunately, given the territo-
rial nature of state practice and opinio juris with regard to
cultural heritage, this customary protection would also not ex-
tend to outer space, an area beyond national jurisdiction.
D. THE TERRITORIAL NATURE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW
It is easy to see that the primary difficulty with the application
of terrestrial cultural heritage law to outer space is the issue of
territorial sovereignty. The treaties governing cultural heritage
law have been primarily drafted with a view to the heritage situ-
ated on the territory of a sovereign state, and customary interna-
tional law reflects the same understanding. This problem stems
from a concept enshrined early in modern international
caselaw. Firstly, the S.S. Lotus case describes some inherent char-
acteristics of international law:
International law governs relations between independent States.
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages gen-
erally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in
order to regulate the relations between these co-existing inde-
pendent communities or with a view to the achievement of com-
mon aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
therefore be presumed.362
Growing from this principle, one must look to the language re-
garding territorial sovereignty memorialized in the Island of Pal-
mas case:
358 Id. ¶ 6(c).
359 UNESCO Res. 32C/33, Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruc-
tion of Cultural Heritage (Oct. 17, 2003).
360 Id. at annex.
361 Contra O’Keefe, supra note 314, at 209.
362 S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18
(Sept. 7).
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Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies indepen-
dence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the
functions of a State. The development of the national organisa-
tion of States during the last few centuries and, as a corollary, the
development of international law, have established this principle
of the exclusive competence of the State in regard to its own ter-
ritory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in set-
tling most questions that concern international relations.363
Given these early developments, it is easy to understand why
cultural heritage treaties have largely focused on the conten-
tious issue of the protection of cultural heritage within the
boundaries of a state. This protection reflects a restriction on a
state’s territorial sovereignty, a signifier of its independence.
Thus, while some general provisions regarding protection of
cultural heritage would apply to space heritage as discussed
above, the regime is largely designed to solve a problem distinct
from that of space heritage.
While some cultural heritage law provisions can, and do, ap-
ply to space heritage as discussed in this section, such limited
protections are insufficient as a regime for the protection of
space heritage generally. Such protections include prohibitions
on theft or vandalism and illicit transfer as well as general over-
tures of a responsibility to protect. A solution must be devised,
as terrestrial cultural heritage law was designed to overcome a
territorial sovereignty problem distinct from the issues of terri-
tory in space law.
IV. PROTECTING SPACE HERITAGE
A. NASA RECOMMENDATIONS AND “KEEP-OUT ZONES”
Because there were no U.S. government guidelines for space
objects operating in the vicinity of U.S. hardware on the lunar
surface, a Lunar Historic Site team, including a wide array of
NASA personnel, was convened to address the issue and provide
guidance for the commercial community.364 On July 20, 2011,
NASA released NASA’s Recommendations to Space-Faring Entities:
How to Protect and Preserve the Historic and Scientific Value of U.S.
Government Lunar Artifacts (Recommendations).365 This docu-
363 Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
364 PROTECTING & PRESERVING APOLLO PROGRAM LUNAR LANDING SITES & ARTI-
FACTS, supra note 2, at 2.
365 NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING ENTITIES, supra note 8, at 1.
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ment was intended to provide “interim recommendations” until
a multilateral solution is found or at least until more formal U.S.
government guidance is developed.366 The Recommendations
protect not only the Apollo artifacts and impact sites but also
impact sites and equipment from unmanned U.S. missions;367
an extensive catalogue of protected Apollo artifacts is included
as an appendix to the document.368
This document states that it is “consistent with international
law,” including the Outer Space Treaty, and clarifies that it does
not promulgate binding legal requirements.369 Importantly, the
NASA Recommendations assert the continuing ownership by
the U.S. government of NASA artifacts on the Moon,370 af-
firming Article VIII rights under the Outer Space Treaty and
implicitly rejecting any possibility of abandonment. The docu-
ment specifically “seeks coordination in advance of lunar activi-
ties that would impact NASA artifacts of historic and scientific
interest to ensure that all appropriate interests are recognized
and protected.”371 This statement could be considered a call for
consultations in accordance with Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty.372 NASA is providing an unambiguous assertion of which
actions will cause harmful interference with its space objects.373
From this perspective, any state which intends to act in a way
contrary to the Recommendations would be required to consult
with the United States first,374 or bear responsibility for violating
the Outer Space Treaty.
For example, operation of rocket engines in close proximity
to protected sites can cause “contamination and degradation” of
the site, due to the fact that the lunar surface is coated with a
layer of dust and loose particles.375 “Lunar soil particles with
diameters on the order of several micrometers are adhesive to
metal and glass surface,” and the interaction between lunar dust
366 Id. at 5.
367 Id.
368 Id. at 43–93.
369 Id. at 6.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX.
373 See NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING ENTITIES, supra note 8, at 5.
374 See id. at 6.
375 Id. at 28.
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and machines on the surface cause significant difficulties.376
One concrete example of damage to a space object and to scien-
tific data that may be obtained from such an object is recounted
as follows:
The Apollo 12 LM [Landing Module] landed 155 m from the
Surveyor 3 spacecraft and retrieved material samples from the
spacecraft for later analysis. Even though Surveyor was in a crater
and below the horizontal plane by 4.3 m and thus “under” the
main sheet of material blown from the LM, the Surveyor space-
craft received significant sandblasting and pitting from the
Apollo landing.377
The described mission was undertaken for the purpose of ana-
lyzing the long-term effects of exposure to the space environ-
ment on the lunar surface.378 Such preservation for scientific
value is yet another reason that heritage objects in space must
be protected.
“[T]here is now increasingly talk of safety or ‘keep-out’ zones
around space objects.”379 The NASA Recommendations estab-
lish a keep-out zone around lunar heritage sites ranging from
0.5 to 2.0 kilometers in radial distance.380 The Recommenda-
tions define a keep-out zone as “the recommended boundary
areas into which visiting spacecraft should not enter.”381
Keep-out zones are also expressly referenced in a Russian na-
tional space act. The Russian Federation exercises functional ju-
risdiction over the area around their space objects: “In direct
proximity to a space object of Russian Federation within the
zone minimally necessary for ensuring safety of space activity,
rules may be established that shall be binding for Russian and
foreign organizations and citizens.”382 Critically, this provision
376 B. Kent Joosten et al., Lunar and Mars Outposts and Habitats, in FUTURE AER-
ONAUTICAL AND SPACE SYSTEMS 497, 511 (Ahmed K. Noor & Samuel L. Venneri
eds., 1997).
377 NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING ENTITIES, supra note 8, at 13.
378 Spennemann, Out of this World, supra note 7, at 360–61.
379 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 467.
380 NASA’S RECOMMENDATIONS TO SPACE-FARING ENTITIES, supra note 8, at 7.
381 Id. at 9.
382 Federal’nyi Zakon RF o Kosmicheskoi Deyatel’nosti [Federal Law of the
Russian Federation About Space Activities], Dom Sovetov Rossii [Russian House
of Soviets] 2008, No. 5663-1, https://www.roscosmos.ru/media/files/docs/
2016/5663-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NTE-6FCW] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019),
translated in U.N. Office for Outer Space Affairs, Selected Examples of National
Laws Governing Space Activities: Russian Federation, http://www.unoosa.org/
oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/russian_federation/decree_5663-
1_E.html [https://perma.cc/6X77-RHKJ] (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
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relies on “safety” as the foundation for the establishment of
keep-out zones.383 The idea that such zones would be permissi-
ble specifically for safety purposes seems most likely to succeed
in international law.384
Adrian Bueckling has stated his belief that jurisdiction should
extend to the “vital supply and operation area” around a station
on a celestial body,385 thereby permitting such zones in the con-
text of operational requirements. Csabafi shares the view that
such zones may be established if they are “reasonable and instru-
mental to the lawful exercise of one of the ‘freedoms of outer
space.’”386 Thus, “functional jurisdiction” can be exercised over
areas surrounding installations and scientific experiments on
the Moon.387 According to Gennady Zhukov and Yuri Kolosov,
these zones would not constitute territorial appropriations even
when established for an extended period of time.388 It has been
suggested that, utilizing functional jurisdiction, a state could
“enact unilateral legislation that creates such ‘designated areas’
of functional sovereignty in outer space.”389
Proposals for how these zones could be implemented have in-
cluded unilateral establishment as well as zones predicated on
agreements that are either bilateral or multilateral in nature.390
Such zones should not run afoul of Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty, as “[t]here is a clear distinction between sovereignty and
the right to exercise a preventive, protective, or regulatory juris-
diction.”391 Writing in 1987, then-U.S. Air Force Chief of Air and
Space Law, Kenneth Schwetje, a strong proponent of keep-out
zones for safety, security, and traffic management, stated that:
Implicit in the works of all Soviet international lawyers consider-
ing the issue is that the exclusionary zones are an inherent right
of the state of registry. While advocating international agree-
ments to accomplish this end, not one Russian lawyer has ever
383 Id.
384 See White, supra note 182, at 375.
385 Adrian Bueckling, The Formal Legal Status of Lunar Stations, 1 J. SPACE L. 113,
117 (1973).
386 CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 63.
387 Id. at 100.
388 GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 64 (Boris
Belitzky trans., 1984).
389 Jakhu & Buzdugan, supra note 120, at 225 (citing CSABAFI, supra note 27).
390 Schwetje, supra note 123, at 132.
391 Id. at 134.
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denied the possibility of a unilateral declaration of exclusionary
zones.392
From this perspective, absent protest from other states, imple-
mentation of binding zones around lunar landing sites may be
permissible, provided they are reasonable, both in size and dura-
tion, under the circumstances and that reciprocity is offered in
the case of comparable circumstances.393
In putting forth non-binding recommendations, the United
States has demonstrated a desire and willingness to cooperate
on this issue rather than risk conflict. Thus, while the NASA Rec-
ommendations as drafted certainly comply with international
law, they offer relatively weak protection for the Apollo artifacts
and lunar heritage sites.
B. THE APOLLO LUNAR LANDING SITES NATIONAL HISTORIC
PARK BILL
On July 8, 2013, the Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act was
introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives.394 The bill was
introduced to “preserve and protect” the landing sites of all the
Apollo missions “for the benefit of present and future genera-
tions” and “for scientific inquiry” as well as “to improve public
understanding of the Apollo program and its legacy.”395
In the language of the bill, the administration of the Histori-
cal Park created by the Act was to be conducted in accordance
with “applicable international law and treaties.”396 It thus com-
mitted such administration to conform with the constraints of
the Outer Space Treaty, Return and Rescue Agreement, Liabil-
ity Convention, and Registration Convention, as well as any cul-
tural heritage conventions to which the United States is a party.
Unfortunately, the Act identified the sites as “nationally signifi-
cant”397 rather than classifying them as humanity’s heritage,
weakening the Act from the perspective of the “benefit of man-
kind” principle.398
The Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act was carefully crafted to
avoid conflict with the non-appropriation principle, specifying
that “[t]he Historical Park may only be comprised” of “the arti-
392 Id. at 139.
393 See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 130, at 293.
394 Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act, H.R. 2617, 113th Cong. (2013).
395 Id. § 3.
396 Id. § 6(a).
397 Id. § 3(1).
398 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. I.
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facts on the surface of the Moon,”399 and it therefore does not
classify any of the surface of the Moon itself as part of the park.
It likewise stated that access to the sites will be managed by
means including “coordination with other spacefaring nations
and entities.”400 This appears to take Article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty directly into account, all but calling for consulta-
tions in the event that a state would wish to access one of these
sites. From the perspective of Article IX, the Act would have had
a similar effect to that of the NASA Recommendations.401
The Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act also called for moni-
toring of the sites,402 which would help to protect the interests of
the United States from a liability perspective in the event of
damage to a site. The Act, however, had one critical flaw in that
it called for the Apollo 11 landing site in particular to be submit-
ted to UNESCO for designation as a World Heritage Site.403 As
we have seen in Section IV of this Article, such classification is
impossible, as states are only welcome to submit those sites lo-
cated on their territory.
Nicolas Matte has likened the zones created by Article 7(3) of
the Moon Agreement to such national parks: “Following a pro-
posal of the United States delegation, provisions have been
made for the establishment of protected zones on the Moon as
international scientific reserves, in cases of special interest. They
would be similar to national parks on earth, serving to protect
sites or phenomena of . . . importance.”404 As the United States
is not a party to the Moon Agreement,405 however, the Act could
not be asserted as seizing upon a right granted by that treaty.
Of course, as states are not bound in international law by the
national legislation of other states,406 this Act would have had
little impact outside of the United States unless the Apollo 11
site were to be successfully classed as a World Heritage Site, in
which case the international rules of the World Heritage Con-
vention would apply. If it had passed, the Apollo Lunar Landing
Legacy Act would, however, have bound U.S. nationals and any
399 H.R. 2617 § 5(b).
400 Id. § 7(a)(2).
401 See supra section IV.A.
402 H.R. 2617 § 7(a)(1).
403 See id. § 8.
404 Matte, Treaty Relating to the Moon, supra note 153, at 262.
405 COPUOS, Agreement Status, supra note 36, at 9.
406 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACE 376 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
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entities launching from U.S. facilities, comprising a significant
number of potential actors in this arena.
C. THE ONE SMALL STEP ACT
In the last few years, efforts to protect humanity’s space heri-
tage sites have intensified, largely due to the advocacy efforts of
a nonprofit organization and its founder, Michelle Hanlon.407
These efforts have led to the creation of Senate Bill 1694, titled
the “One Small Step to Protect Human Heritage in Space
Act,”408 colloquially referred to as the “One Small Step Act.” The
Act details why the Apollo landing sites “are of outstanding uni-
versal value to humanity”—citing their “cultural, historical,
archaeological, anthropological, scientific, and engineering” sig-
nificance—utilizing the language of terrestrial cultural heritage
law.409 This Act primarily relies on domestic law to enforce pro-
tection of these sites with regard to entities licensed by the
United States by requiring compliance with NASA’s Recommen-
dations, to be updated as needed, and “any successor heritage
preservation recommendations, guidelines, or principles relat-
ing to the protection and preservation” of such space heritage
issued by NASA.410 The Act also grants authority for U.S. licens-
ing entities to charge penalties for violations.411 A call to the
President for initiation of diplomatic negotiations regarding this
Act is also issued,412 recognizing that a binding multilateral
treaty that utilized the same parameters for protection as the
U.S. licensing regime would be sufficient to protect space
heritage.
This Act was carefully drafted to comply with international ob-
ligations, though it does not reference the Outer Space Treaty
(or indeed any treaty). It simultaneously recognizes the limits of
its scope in terms of domestic enforcement of heritage protec-
tion and endeavors to move the international discussion for-
ward. Additionally, by utilizing the NASA Recommendations as a
407 The Organization, FOR ALL MOONKIND, https://www.forallmoonkind.org/
about/the-organization/ [https://perma.cc/Q4Q5-R7RP] (last visited Oct. 15,
2019); see Currie Engel, ‘We Need That Boot Print.’ Inside the Fight to Save the Moon’s
Historic Sites Before It’s Too Late, TIME (July 18, 2019), https://time.com/5627640/
moon-historic-sites/ [https://perma.cc/ZX5Q-J4NW].
408 One Small Step Act, S. 1694, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).
409 Id. § 2(a)(6)–(7).
410 Id. §§ 2(a)(11), 3(a)–(b).
411 Id. § 3(d).
412 See id. § 2(b).
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baseline for protection, it furthers the argument that any pro-
posed action that would not comply with the Recommendations
would require initial consultations with the United States under
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty. This Act, if passed, would
be a significant positive step forward for the protection of space
heritage.
D. CALIFORNIA & NEW MEXICO HERITAGE LISTS
As of 2010, both California and New Mexico have added Tran-
quility Base to their state lists of protected sites.413 This sort of
unilateral action that only impacts the nationals of the launch-
ing state, however, does help to fill in the gap left by Article VII
of the Liability Convention by upholding the general principle
that international law should not regulate relations between a
state and its nationals,414 though this principle is changing due
to the evolution of human rights law.
The “Evaluation of Significance” provided in the nomination
to the California Register of Historical Resources sheds valuable
light on the reasons for the site’s inclusion on California’s
registry:
The assemblage of Objects Associated with Tranquility Base
(OATB) is significant to the history of California and meets all
four of the California Register of Historical Resources eligibility
criteria. The OATB are:
(1) associated with events that have made a significant contri-
bution to the broad patterns of American and human his-
tory because, consistent with California’s role as a leader
in technological innovation, the research, development,
and testing of the technology that was used in the Apollo
11 mission was largely carried out in the State of Califor-
nia. Moreover, the aerospace research industry and mili-
tary research were crucial in the economic development of
portions of the state, including the areas surrounding
Pasadena (Jet Propulsion Laboratory) and Edwards Air
Force Base.
(2) associated with the lives of persons significant in our past
because each of the three astronauts of Apollo 11 (Neil
Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins).
(3) embody a distinctive type of engineering technology
unique to the early aerospace industry because the tech-
nology used for Apollo 11 represents the earliest ground-
413 Walsh, supra note 3, at 236.
414 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 308.
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breaking sophisticated technology of its kind, from which
all subsequent and current aerospace technology is based,
and which was developed largely in facilities located in the
State of California.
(4) can provide important information on the early develop-
ment of space technology.
The Period of Significance is the year 1969. The Date of Signifi-
cance is July 20, 1969. All of the 106+ objects within the bounda-
ries are considered contributing elements to the significance of
the site. Based on the relative lack of atmosphere and no known
return visit to Tranquility Base, the property is assumed to retain
integrity.415
This action cites both the nationalist and universal qualities of
the Tranquility Base historic site and thus avoids one of the pit-
falls of the Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act. Because only mov-
able objects are listed, it is permissible to list the space heritage
located at Tranquility Base under California law.416
As both state’s registrations only consider the objects them-
selves as protected, rather than the surface of the Moon itself,417
such registration does not run afoul of the non-appropriation
principle. Given the location of prominent launch sites in both
California and New Mexico, the desirability of binding entities
launching from these facilities to heritage requirements under
state law is apparent.
While the NASA Recommendations, the Apollo Lunar Land-
ing Legacy Act, the One Small Step Act, and the inclusions on
state heritage lists all take important initial steps to acknowledge
the status of one or more Apollo landing sites as cultural heri-
tage sites, these steps are unfortunately baby steps. They simply
provide protection for the site(s) from the actions of nationals
and mandate consultations with foreign actors in accordance
with international law. It is essential that more robust protec-
tions be developed moving forward.
415 STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, OBJECTS ASSOCIATED WITH
TRANQUILITY BASE 9–10 (Oct. 26, 2009), http://ohp.parks.ca.gov/pages/1067/
files/tranquility%20base_draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/K66H-HWHU].
416 Cf. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5020.1(j) (West 2015).
417 Walsh, supra note 3, at 236.
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V. SOLUTIONS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF SPACE
HERITAGE
A. A BINDING MULTILATERAL SOLUTION
1. New Treaty or Annex
A multilateral treaty negotiated through either the UN-
COPUOS or UNESCO would be an ideal solution, provided that
it would be able to obtain sufficient ratifications among
spacefaring nations to be effective. The Moon Agreement and
Underwater Heritage Convention418 both suffer from under-sub-
scription, and thus pursuing a treaty through either body suffers
a chance of failure, even if the draft of such treaty can be agreed
upon. That is not to say, however, that these bodies themselves
have been failures, merely that attempts to put forth binding
multilateral treaties in recent years have been fraught with
difficulty.
An alternative to an entirely new treaty that may be easier to
achieve would be an annex to the Outer Space Treaty dealing
with space heritage. Annex V to the Antarctic Environmental
Protocol419 would provide a useful model for the protection of
space heritage in this context, stating that “the parties to the
Antarctic Treaty have a veto on the setting up of Areas, and on
inclusions on the list of Antarctic Historic Sites and
Monuments.”420
Article 7(3) of the Moon Agreement, or a modified version
thereof, could also be utilized as a first step in providing the
necessary protections. This non-contentious provision indicates
an awareness of a problem and a willingness to address it in the
international arena.421 Though the Moon Agreement did not
provide a system for visits or inspections of moon facilities or
sites, this gap could be rectified with a new agreement pertain-
ing to space heritage.422
Either of these proposed multilateral treaty solutions should
include: (1) a procedure for designating heritage objects and
sites; (2) a statement that heritage objects are still space objects
418 See UNESCO Res. 31C/24, Convention on the Protection of the Underwa-
ter Cultural Heritage (Nov. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Underwater Heritage
Convention].
419 See Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty annex V,
Oct. 4, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455.
420 Lyall, OST Art. IX, supra note 90, at 664.
421 See supra section II.C.7.
422 See ODUNTAN, supra note 52, at 179.
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for the purpose of international space law; (3) the establishment
of protective zones around objects or sites; (4) a procedure for
the visitation of these zones; and (5) a mechanism for interna-
tional cooperation in the management of these sites. The
“emerging concept . . . of ‘planetary parks’ . . . to protect areas
of celestial bodies for purposes in addition to scientific explora-
tion and use, including historic and aesthetic values, as well as
the interests of future generations” could be implemented to
the benefit of space heritage.423 The inclusion of an effective
planetary protection policy that protects not only the space envi-
ronment, generally, but also specific sites for their unique scien-
tific or historic value would be of benefit to the space law
system.424 It would be more beneficial, however, to reach a solid
agreement regarding space heritage than to overreach, includ-
ing more environmentally-based provisions, and thus potentially
fail in both endeavors.
While a multilateral treaty solution is sought by the One Small
Step Act, that Act has not yet (and may never) enter into domes-
tic law. While the Act states that a binding international agree-
ment would satisfy the needs of protecting the “Apollo 11
landing site and other historic landing sites” and calls upon the
U.S. President to initiate the process of negotiating an interna-
tional agreement,425 it is a long road from the Senate bill to a
treaty. The 2018 White House Report states that “[a]mending
existing multilateral agreements, such as the [Outer Space
Treaty], or drafting and negotiating an additional agreement
specifically relating to preservation of lunar artifacts could pro-
vide explicit and detailed international legal protections,” but it
acknowledges that “the difficulties and risks of negotiating and
bringing such an agreement or amendments into force would
likely outweigh any benefits.”426 The report further goes on to
state the understanding of the Executive that “negotiating any
international agreement—particularly one involving such a
high-profile issue as outer space—is inherently difficult. Similar
423 See Patricia M. Sterns & Leslie I. Tennen, Should There Be an Environmental
“Code of Conduct” for Activities in Outer Space?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-THIRD
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 268, 277–78 (Am. Inst. of Aeronautics
& Astronautics ed., 2010).
424 See id. at 269.
425 One Small Step Act, S. 1694, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(1), (3) (2019).
426 PROTECTING & PRESERVING APOLLO PROGRAM LUNAR LANDING SITES & ARTI-
FACTS, supra note 2, at 5.
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agreements have taken up to 15 years to complete.”427 Moreo-
ver, such an effort “could lead to a backlash against any new
international protections, and even undermine the existing le-
gal protections” or U.S. positions or national interests.428 Thus,
while the White House recognizes the potential benefits of an
agreement or amendment, it also provides an explanation as to
why this is difficult and dangerous from a U.S. perspective.
Therefore, this may call into question whether the President
would sign an act calling for him to initiate these negotiations
and, if so, whether the negotiations would commence or have
the possibility to succeed.
2. Amendments to the World Heritage Convention
It would be possible to extend the full spectrum of World
Heritage Convention protections to space heritage through an
amendment to the Convention itself. The most critical of these
amendments would be a change to Article 3.429 The revised Arti-
cle could read as follows: “It is for each State Party to this Con-
vention to identify and delineate the different properties
situated on its territory, or in outer space and under its jurisdiction,
mentioned in Articles 1 and 2 above.”430 Articles 4 and 5 would
require similar amendments for the provided protections to
fully apply.431 Article 11, regarding heritage located in disputed
territory, could be amended to include space heritage over
which there is a jurisdictional dispute.432
Though the amendments required would be relatively minor
in terms of the scope and number of changes, this solution is
not very likely to come to fruition given the wide acceptance of
the World Heritage Convention and the potentially contentious
inclusion of space heritage. The fact that underwater heritage,
which is also beyond the limits of territorial jurisdiction, was dis-
cussed in a separate convention rather than as an amendment
to World Heritage Convention could also indicate potential
problems with this solution.433 Even if such amendments were to
succeed, difficulties would arise if some states only remain party
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 See World Heritage Convention, supra note 20, art. 3.
430 See id. (the language in italics represents the proposed change to Article 3).
431 See id. arts. 4–5.
432 See id. art. 11.
433 See Underwater Heritage Convention, supra note 418.
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to the original Convention while those who ratified the amend-
ments would fall under a different set of rules.
3. U.N. Trusteeship
Another multilateral solution is the use of the United Nations
Trusteeship System to administer space heritage. “The Interna-
tional Trusteeship System provides for the administration of cer-
tain non-self-governing territories by fully developed States
acting as trustees.”434 Article 75 of the U.N. Charter establishes
the system “for the administration and supervision of such terri-
tories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual
agreements.”435 Contrary to popular belief, the Trusteeship
Council (TC) “was not abolished, it only suspended its opera-
tion (on November 1, 1994).”436
Placing space heritage sites into trusteeship as specified in the
U.N. Charter would be an effective solution providing protec-
tion for such heritage. Territories can be “voluntarily placed
under the system by states responsible for their administra-
tion.”437 Thus, it would be most appropriate for the state retain-
ing jurisdiction and control over the objects at a particular site
to place such a site into the system as the owner of the space
heritage. These trusteeship mandates historically applied to ter-
ritories that “were deemed to be principally unsuitable for devel-
opment into self-governing States.”438 Obviously, barring future
colonization of celestial bodies, sites in outer space would fall
into this category.
Such use of the trusteeship system would fall within appropri-
ate, established objectives, namely “to further international
peace and security” and “to ensure equal treatment in social,
economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the
United Nations and their nationals . . . .”439 This use would pre-
vent conflict resulting from questions about the freedom of use
of outer space or destruction of space heritage and would en-
sure that states are able to maintain equal access to such sites as
434 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1099 (Bruno
Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
435 U.N. Charter art. 75.
436 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 434, at
1129.
437 U.N. Charter art. 77, ¶ 1(c).
438 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 434, at
1115.
439 U.N. Charter art. 76, ¶ 1(a), (d).
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permissible within the bounds of their protection, both for sci-
entific and commercial purposes.
The terms of each trusteeship agreement are “agreed upon by
the states directly concerned,” thus, such states owning heritage
objects in a territory or wishing to use or explore such territory
have an established mechanism to ensure their interests are
respected in any final agreement.440 Though trusteeship agree-
ments have generally been concluded between the administer-
ing authority of a territory and the U.N., there has not been any
doubt about the treaty character of these agreements despite
the fact that they were only consented to by the administering
authority and the U.N.441 Thus, participation of additional states
beyond the state having jurisdiction and control over the heri-
tage (and wishing to protect it) would not be necessary. The
composition of the TC itself is flexible, allowing for a balancing
of the interests of those states that are sources of space heritage
and those that are not.442
Trusteeship agreements “include the terms under which the
trust territory will be administered and designate the authority
which will exercise the administration of the trust territory.”443
The administering authority can be the U.N. or one or more
states.444 As a general rule, there has historically been only a sin-
gle state acting as the administering authority of the territory in
trusteeship, with the notable exception to this trend being Na-
uru.445 As it had never done so, there is an unresolved question
as to whether the U.N. itself should become an administering
authority, which it is permitted to do under the Charter.446 This
could be an ideal solution from a cooperation perspective, but it
is unlikely given its wide divergence from status quo practice.
“Theories about sovereignty could not help to solve the legal
questions that arose” regarding the “international personality”
of trusteeship territories; in these cases, international instru-
ments, such as mandates, the U.N. Charter, and trusteeship
agreements, determined the “rights and duties” of the terri-
440 See id. art. 79.
441 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 434, at
1118–19.
442 See U.N. Charter art. 86 (explaining that membership is divided between
U.N. member states that do and do not administer the trust territory).
443 Id. art. 81.
444 Id.
445 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 434, at
1122.
446 See id.
370 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [84
tory.447 The concept of sovereignty is alien to trusteeship
cases,448 thereby providing a useful mechanism for outer space.
Given that trusteeship does not confer sovereignty to an ad-
ministering state, no conflict with the non-appropriation princi-
ple of space law would exist. Administration by the U.N. itself
could not reasonably be construed as “national appropriation”
and thus would provide a stable, reliable solution.
The U.N. Charter specifies that, with the exception of agree-
ments made in the context of trusteeship, there would be no
alteration to states’ rights with regard to any existing interna-
tional instruments;449 thus, participation in the trusteeship sys-
tem would otherwise not impact states’ rights in international
space law or cultural heritage law.
As the TC’s Rules of Procedure were amended so “the TC
could be convened ‘where occasion may require,’”450 it would
be possible to reconvene the Council to administer space heri-
tage. When the U.N. Secretary-General originally proposed the
dissolution of the Trusteeship Council, some states “believed
that the TC should be given a new mandate, such as the respon-
sibility for safeguarding the ‘common heritage of mankind.’”451
A subsequent proposal by the Secretary-General stated:
Member States appear to have decided to retain the [TC]. The
Secretary-General proposes, therefore, that it be reconstituted as
the forum through which Member States exercise their collective
trusteeship for the integrity of the global environment and com-
mon areas such as the oceans, atmosphere and outer space. At
the same time, it should serve to link the United Nations and civil
society in addressing these areas of global concern, which re-
quire the active contribution of public, private and voluntary
sectors.452
The use of the TC advised by this Article fits within the ambit of
the Secretary-General’s proposal.
Visits to the trust territories are provided for by the U.N.
Charter,453 and there are, in fact, specific rules spelling out the
447 Id. at 1103.
448 International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J.
Rep. 128, 150 (July 11).
449 U.N. Charter art. 80, ¶ 1.
450 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 434, at
1129.
451 Id.
452 U.N. Secretary-General, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform,
¶ 85, U.N. Doc. A/51/950 (July 14, 1997).
453 U.N. Charter art. 87, ¶ 1(c).
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procedure for such visits.454 Such visits would be a more effective
solution for heritage than visits taking place under Article XII of
the Outer Space Treaty.455
In accordance with the U.N. Charter, the TC is mandated, as
appropriate, to “avail itself of the assistance” from specialized
U.N. agencies.456 This provision provides a clear option for col-
laboration between the TC, UNESCO, and COPUOS. In fact,
UNESCO has previously provided help and support to the
TC,457 so a partnership between the two bodies for the adminis-
tration of space heritage sites would not be unusual.
B. A “SOFT LAW” SOLUTION
As discussed in more detail above, “[t]he international treaty-
making process can be slow and, at times, may not even result in
agreement.”458 Thus, soft law alternatives have recently been
pursued as a substitute for binding multilateral agreements. “In
general, we may say that the era of treaty formation for the law
of outer space is over, and it has been replaced by more specific
and incremental steps including memoranda of understandings,
Framework Agreements, voluntary regimes, codes of conduct,
and case law decisions.”459
The type of soft law solution contemplated here is a
“pledge”—this category encompasses documents such as non-
binding U.N. agreements.460 A soft law pledge is more flexible,
more preliminary (and thus is not as precedential or public as a
treaty), and it does not necessitate a complex ratification pro-
cess.461 One benefit of such agreements is that they are drafted
on a consensus basis, in the self-interest of the involved states,
and therefore do not depend on an effective enforcement
454 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 434, at
1132–34.
455 Compare U.N. Charter art. 87(1)(c), with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4,
art. XII.
456 U.N. Charter art. 91.
457 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 434, at
1138.
458 Steven A. Mirmina, Reducing the Proliferation of Orbital Debris: Alternatives to a
Legally Binding Instrument, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 649, 652 (2005).
459 Jonathan F. Galloway, Revolution and Evolution in the Law of Outer Space, 87
NEB. L. REV. 516, 518 (2008).
460 See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 581, 587 (2005).
461 Id. at 591.
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mechanism in order to hold legal weight.462 Though they can
still take substantial time to negotiate, declarations are adopted
much more quickly than treaties come into force, due to the
lack of a lengthy ratification procedure.
Such resolutions have been used consistently in space law.463
In the most successful case, the Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of
Outer Space led to the formation of both customary law and
treaty law, thus becoming binding norms.464 A soft law solution
should be used as a step towards achieving a long-term space
heritage solution. “Working outside the concepts of territorial
sovereignty, but remaining within those of the jurisdiction of li-
censing states, any arrangements need to provide sufficient
room for states voluntarily to assume obligations and to avoid
any implication that these are imposed.”465 Any such solution
would need to address the same issues as a multilateral treaty, as
discussed above, but it would be a positive step in setting norms
of behavior for heritage in outer space.
The discussions of space cultural heritage at the 2019
COPUOS Legal Subcommittee indicate that the matter is under
consideration at the international level.466 The presence of For
All Moonkind as an observer has brought the issue into open
discussion in this international forum.467 Additionally, the U.S.
delegate recognized the importance of mankind’s heritage in
space in comments to the body.468 These signs point to the pos-
sibility that the subject of cultural heritage in space may move
along the same trajectory through COPUOS as other issues have
done. In this author’s view, the initial discussions leading to a
soft law solution by COPUOS could lead to binding long-term
protection for humanity’s heritage in space.
462 Galloway, supra note 459, at 519.
463 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space (Dec. 14, 1992); G.A. Res. 41/65, Principles Relating to
Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (Dec. 3, 1986); G.A. Res. 37/92,
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Interna-
tional Direct Television Broadcasting (Dec. 10, 1982).
464 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
465 Lyall, OST Art. IX, supra note 90, at 664.
466 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Sub-
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C. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Bilateral agreements could be used either alone or in con-
junction with a soft law solution or a unilateral action. Bilateral
treaties can also contribute to the subsequent development of
multilateral treaties; they serve as a proof-of-concept for treaty
provisions.469 “[B]ilateral agreements fulfil an important role in
international cooperation for space activities.”470 They have
been, and will be in the future, a significant vehicle for coopera-
tion in space.471 Such agreements have been used by the United
States, the Soviet Union, and a number of other spacefaring na-
tions.472 Bilateral agreements can take the form of: (1) a classical
convention; (2) executive agreements; (3) memoranda of un-
derstanding; or (4) exchange of letters.473 These agreements are
useful both for spacefaring states and non-spacefaring states
who wish to cooperate and share benefits.474 “Bilateral arrange-
ments for co-operation in space are based partly on bilateral
agreements sufficiently formal in character to have been regis-
tered with the United Nations as international engagements and
partly on arrangements which have not been expressed in com-
parable legal form.”475 Bilateral agreements have also been used
from an underwater cultural heritage perspective to protect par-
ticular wrecks on the high seas.476 Such agreements could be
general in subject matter, or pertain to a specific site or series of
sites, similar to the Titanic Agreement.477
D. UNILATERAL ACTION
Unilateral actions, such as unilateral declarations and na-
tional legislation, are another avenue open to address the sub-
ject of space heritage. “The legality of such unilateral action
ultimately depends on whether the exercise of jurisdiction is
within reasonable limits.”478 Good faith and reasonableness are
essential in the exercise of appropriate functional jurisdiction in
469 See S. Neil Hosenball, Bilateral Agreements, in 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, supra
note 103, at 347, 350.
470 VAN BOGAERT, supra note 40, at 281.
471 Hosenball, supra note 469, at 356.
472 See VAN BOGAERT, supra note 40, at 276–81.
473 Id. at 276.
474 Hosenball, supra note 469, at 356.
475 JENKS, SPACE LAW, supra note 99, at 82.
476 Sarah Dromgoole, The International Agreement for the Protection of the Titanic:
Problems and Prospects, 37 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 1, 2 (2006).
477 See id.
478 Cf. CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 66.
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outer space.479 Good faith is a fundamental principle of interna-
tional law from which rules concerning reasonableness and fair-
ness derive.480
It may be said that
[T]he obligation of States not to appropriate outer space or ce-
lestial bodies in any way does not affect their other rights, origi-
nal or derived, to legislate for the protection of their lawful
interests, the preservation of resources in outer space and to is-
sue regulations “desirable or necessary on grounds of public or-
der and morals” without unnecessarily interfering with the
principle of the freedom of outer space.481
1. Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty
The utilization of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty is a
solution that, while not complete, may be expediently imple-
mented. In order to exploit Article IX, a state must make clear
what actions will cause potentially harmful interference with its
preservation of space heritage.482 There are a number of pos-
sibilities available for this purpose. “Security can be achieved on
the basis of reciprocal tolerance and accommodation.”483 Article
IX lays the foundation of such reciprocity and cooperation.484
One option available is a procedure of updates to the U.N.
space object registry. Whether the mission of a space object is at
its end, the object is out of control, out of orbit, or even if it has
been shattered into many pieces, such information can be ad-
ded to the U.N. registry in accordance with a broad interpreta-
tion of the relevant provisions of the Registration Convention.485
In fact, COPUOS has recommended that “[a]ny useful informa-
tion relating to the function of the space object in addition to
the general function requested by the Registration Convention”
and “[a]ny change of status in operations” be provided to the
Secretary-General for registry purposes.486 Thus, states can up-
date the registry of space objects to indicate that these objects
are now considered space heritage and to catalogue artifacts as-
sociated with the object and provide location information.
479 Id. at 100.
480 J.F. O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1991).
481 CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 99–100.
482 See discussion supra section II.C.8.
483 BHATT, supra note 128, at 84.
484 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX.
485 VAN BOGAERT, supra note 40, at 121.
486 G.A. Res. 62/101, ¶ 2(a)(iv), (b)(ii) (Jan. 10, 2008).
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A state may also issue unilateral statements, such as the NASA
Recommendations, to unambiguously provide concrete infor-
mation as to what actions will interfere with its heritage. Provid-
ing a well-reasoned rationale for why such actions present a
danger, as NASA has done, should aid the effectiveness of such
an action. A vital flaw with this solution, however, is the fact that
although a consultation may be requested, it is possible within
the bounds of the Outer Space Treaty that such consultation
may not occur.487 The subjective premise of Article IX poses dif-
ficulty for its viability as a serious solution to this problem.488
National legislation is also recommended in order to protect
sites from nationals of that state, a feat that cannot be achieved
under international law, as discussed above. This action would
serve as a corollary to the solutions proposed here.
2. Construction of Facilities
Finally, a less viable unilateral solution is the construction of
stations or facilities around important sites of space heritage.
This solution would obviate the need to address concerns such
as keep-out zones, functional jurisdiction, and the exclusive use
of outer space, as the jurisdiction and control over facilities is
already decided in international space law.489 This proposal,
however, comes at great cost. Of course, the financial expense of
constructing a lunar facility would be very high, but such an ac-
tion would also raise questions of whether the action was con-
ducted in good faith or with due regard for the activities of
other states in outer space.490 In that regard, it poses a threat to
the international space order. That said, while this is clearly not
a viable solution for space heritage generally, the threat of such
a solution has the possibility to spark urgency in multilateral dis-
cussions, perhaps resulting in a more expedient resolution of
the question than would otherwise occur. Fundamentally,
though, this idea should be used as a last resort, both for legal
and practical reasons.
VI. CONCLUSION
As commercial space technology continues to develop in the
future, “[m]any people will want to visit the place where their
487 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 23, at 257.
488 See id. at 258.
489 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV.
490 Cf. CSABAFI, supra note 27, at 100.
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ancestors first reached the Moon’s surface and opened up the
first non-Earth place for human residence and activities.”491
Thus, it is necessary to protect these sites not only for their pre-
sent scientific and historic value but also for future generations.
“From an economic perspective, the preservation of historical
assets has the potential to generate a powerful heritage industry
and increase tourism and related business.”492 Therefore, the
concerns for humanity’s heritage are also accompanied by con-
cerns for the financial viability of space enterprises. Lunar tour-
ism has already been contemplated by such ventures as Golden
Spike493 and Moon Express,494 and the Google Lunar X prize is
offering boons to participants for approaching lunar heritage
sites.495 Future interaction with these sites is inevitable. If “the
point of history is to learn from the past,”496 then it is necessary
to preserve the past in order to learn from it.
“The main objective for sustainable heritage tourism planning
is to answer two questions, namely, ‘which are the most appro-
priate cultural heritage places for development for tourism?’
and ‘what is the best way to manage those heritage places for
sustainability?’”497 These questions must be answered first by the
legal gatekeepers of heritage before it is too late. At present,
states are in the best position to determine appropriate ap-
proach vectors for heritage sites necessary for their sustained via-
bility. Therefore, it is the responsibility of states, be it
unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally, to provide such rules.
491 T.F. Rogers, Safeguarding Tranquility Base: Why the Earth’s Moon Base Should
Become a World Heritage Site, 20 SPACE POL’Y 5, 5 (2004).
492 Vadi, supra note 122, at 899.
493 Joel Achenbach, Golden Spike Space-Tourism Company: ‘To the Moon!,’ WASH.
POST (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
golden-spike-space-tourism-company-to-the-moon/2012/12/06/52eedcc8-3fc3-
11e2-ae43-cf491b837f7b_story.html [https://perma.cc/A6NB-EKT4].
494 Coburn Palmer, Moon Express: $10,000 Lunar Flights Available by 2026, Space
Tourism Takes Off, INQUISITR (Dec. 3, 2016), https://www.inquisitr.com/3765015/
moon-express-10000-lunar-flights-available-by-2026-space-tourism-takes-off/
[https://perma.cc/3W5J-K8LF].
495 Doug Messier, Google Increases Financial Commitment to Google Lunar X Prize,
PARABOLIC ARC (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.parabolicarc.com/2015/01/27/
google-increases-commitment-google-lunar-prize/ [https://perma.cc/4CLZ-
LQGG].
496 Michael S. Goodman, Making Space for History, 17 SPACE POL’Y 229, 230
(2001).
497 Hilary du Cros, A New Model to Assist in Planning for Sustainable Cultural Heri-
tage Tourism, 3 INT’L J. TOURISM RES. 165, 166 (2001).
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“In short, the force of technological change must be tempered
by the rule of law.”498
This Article has revealed that there are some protections avail-
able for space heritage in the international legal regime, but un-
fortunately, many of these protections only become available
after such heritage has been disturbed. These rules include lia-
bility for damage to space objects, return of space objects that
have returned to Earth, prohibitions against theft and vandalism
of cultural property, and prohibitions on illicit transfer. The
World Heritage Convention only applies to space heritage in a
very limited way: it specifies that heritage not included on the
World Heritage List can still qualify for protection as heritage
and calls for international cooperation in identifying and con-
serving such heritage. The most helpful provisions in interna-
tional law for the protection of space heritage can be found in
Articles VIII and IX of the Outer Space Treaty, respectively—the
former establishes jurisdiction, ownership, and control over
space objects and the latter mandates that states conduct their
space activities with due regard for other states.
There are various means available to states for protecting
their heritage from their own nationals, several of which the
United States has experimented with, but the question of pro-
tection from other states’ space activities is more difficult to
answer.
While removal of (parts of) a spacecraft and damage to such
craft by non-nationals are covered by the UN conventions, and
while national legislation may cover the actions of nationals,
there is no convention that can prevent a party from going near a
spacecraft/artefact on the lunar or any other planetary surface
(apart from Earth) while not actually damaging it.499
It is possible in international law that keep-out zones can be es-
tablished utilizing the functional jurisdiction available to states
with regard to their space activities, but the unilateral imposi-
tion of such zones is untested. Given that exclusivity in an area
surrounding a space object on a celestial body would only pro-
vide marginal additional hindrance to other states wishing to ex-
plore space but would be a great boon in the protection of
humanity’s heritage in space, the principle that “a socially im-
498 Galloway, supra note 459, at 520.
499 Spennemann, Out of this World, supra note 7, at 363.
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portant interest shall not perish for the sake of respect for an
objectively minor right”500 should apply in this instance.
The most viable and effective means for the protection of
space heritage is a multistep process that begins with the use of
existing protections under the space law and cultural heritage
regimes. As these protections are already in place, there does
not need to be any lapse before implementation. States should
promptly take unilateral action in cases where they have not
done so to maximize the benefit that they can receive under
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty for the protection of space
heritage. Next, states should enter into either general or site-
specific bilateral agreements with individual states that are ac-
tively planning activities in the vicinity of their space heritage in
the near term. Meanwhile, a soft law solution should be pursued
in the form of a U.N. declaration, preferably through COPUOS,
though UNESCO is also a viable option. Hopefully, these steps
will eventually lead to a new multilateral treaty, a protocol to the
Outer Space Treaty, or the utilization of the U.N. trusteeship
system for the protection of space heritage. Even if none of
these binding multilateral treaty solutions are achieved, there is
still a possibility that customary international law will emerge,
originating from the soft law solution and state practice.
Generally speaking, “international law . . . has evolved from
the ‘law of co-existence’ to the ‘law of cooperation.’”501 In the
space heritage arena, this is apparent in NASA’s Recommenda-
tions, which seek a cooperative solution to the problem of pro-
tecting lunar sites and artifacts. In international law, NASA’s
Recommendations can work in conjunction with the provisions
of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty in good faith to achieve
a desirable result. The importance of the pursuit of a solution in
good faith cannot be overstated, regardless of which recom-
mended solutions are applied or if some entirely different solu-
tion prevails. “To do nothing is to fail, individually and
collectively, to shoulder this responsibility.”502 Thus, it is our re-
sponsibility as lawyers to continue to pursue and advocate solu-
tions to the problem of space heritage before other explorers
return to the Moon.
500 BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
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